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MIRANDA IN COMPARATIVE LAW 
STEPHEN C. THAMAN* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Historically, confessions of guilt have been the “best evidence in the whole 
world”1 in all systems of criminal justice, whether characterized as 
“adversarial” and rooted in the English Common Law,2 or “inquisitorial” and 
based on Continental European traditions founded in Roman and Canon law.3  
The “formal rules of evidence” in Continental European inquisitorial systems 
expressly provided for torture of suspects caught in flagrante or when 
circumstantial evidence indicated a strong suspicion of guilt.4  While torture 
was infrequently used in Common Law England,5 criminal suspects were 
routinely interrogated by justices of the peace under a procedure authorized by 
statute.6  Incriminating statements were admitted through the testimony of the 
justice of the peace at a time when criminal defendants were incompetent to 
 
*Associate Professor of Law, Saint Louis University School of Law. 
 1. This expression comes from the Pre-1864 Laws of the Russian Empire (1857 ed.), 
quoted in SAMUEL KUCHEROV, THE ORGANS OF SOVIET ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE: THEIR 
HISTORY AND OPERATION 610 (1970). 
 2. For a discussion of systematic pressures on the accused to speak in early English 
criminal procedure, see John H. Langbein, The Privilege and Common Law Criminal Procedure: 
The Sixteenth to the Eighteenth Centuries, in R.H. HELMHOLZ ET AL., THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST 
SELF-INCRIMINATION: ITS ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT 88 (1997) [hereinafter Langbein, The 
Privilege]. 
 3. Under the French Ordinance of 1670, the confession was proof “par excellence.”  “[O]f 
all the proofs which can be had in criminal cases, the accused’s confession is the strongest and 
most certain; consequently that proof is sufficient. . . . Such a confession is the most complete 
proof that could be wished for.” ADHEMAR ESMEIN, A HISTORY OF CONTINENTAL CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO FRANCE 262 (1913). 
 4. See Constitutio Criminalis Carolina §§ 23, 25-27.  For a translation, see JOHN H. 
LANGBEIN, PROSECUTING CRIME IN THE RENAISSANCE 273-75 app. B (1974) [hereinafter 
LANGBEIN, PROSECUTING CRIME]. 
 5. JOHN H. LANGBEIN, TORTURE AND THE LAW OF PROOF: EUROPE AND ENGLAND IN THE 
ANCIENT RÉGIME 138 (1977) [hereinafter LANGBEIN, TORTURE]. 
 6. Marian Bail Statute, 1554-55, 1 & 2 Phil. & M., c. 13 (Eng.), reprinted in LANGBEIN, 
PROSECUTING CRIME, supra note 4, at 256-57. 
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testify.7  There was considerable authority at the time that the privilege against 
self-incrimination in England was meant to protect only against compelled 
testimony under oath and did not apply to questioning by justices of the peace, 
which was not under oath.8  Although the institution of questioning suspects by 
justices of the peace in Sixteenth and Seventeenth Century England has been 
characterized as “a system of pretrial inquiry that was devoted to pressuring 
the accused to incriminate himself,”9 the use of coercion, torture, threats or 
promises by interrogators was generally considered to render a statement 
involuntary and in violation of the privilege against self-incrimination.10 
Indeed, it was perhaps foolish for suspects to refuse to give a statement to 
the justices of the peace, because they were incompetent to testify at trial and 
did not have lawyers to speak for them until well into the Nineteenth 
Century.11  Since criminal defendants were often facing the death penalty even 
in non-homicide cases, the only way to appeal to the jury’s mercy was to speak 
and hope the jury would exercise “pious perjury” even in the event the 
defendant’s guilt could be adequately proven.12  In some situations, confessing 
one’s guilt to the jury could even lead to mitigation or acquittal.13  Procedural 
strictures on the accused, such as threatened Draconian punishments coupled 
with the hopes of mitigation and mercy exercised first by the jury, and later by 
the judge in the event of a guilty verdict, are at the root of English and 
American plea-bargaining.  These strictures have been characterized as the 
Common Law answer to the Continental European institution of torture.14  The 
English system of pretrial examination by justices of the peace was 
transplanted to American soil and prevailed until the late Nineteenth Century, 
 
 7. See Albert W. Alschuler, A Peculiar Privilege in Historical Perspective, in R.H. 
HELMHOLZ ET AL., THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION: ITS ORIGINS AND 
DEVELOPMENT 194 (1997) [hereinafter Alschuler]. 
 8. Alschuler, supra note 7, at 186-87, 193. 
 9. Langbein, The Privilege, supra note 2, at 91. 
 10. On the blurry distinction between the inherent pressures of pre-trial interrogation by 
justices of the peace and the prohibition of torture in Colonial America, see Eben Moglen, The 
Privilege in British North America: The Colonial Period to the Fifth Amendment, in R.H. 
HELMHOLZ ET AL., THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION: ITS ORIGINS AND 
DEVELOPMENT 118-21 (1997) [hereinafter Moglen]. 
 11. Langbein, The Privilege, supra note 2, at 83-87.  Langbein calls this the “accused 
speaks” form of trial.  Id. 
 12. Id. at 93-94. 
 13. Id.  In Tsarist Russia, which had a jury system from 1864 to 1917, studies indicated that 
juries would be more likely to acquit or mitigate the sentence if the defendant gave a full judicial 
confession at trial.  See Stephen C. Thaman, Europe’s New Jury Systems: The Cases of Spain and 
Russia, 62 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 233, 246 n.70 (1999) [hereinafter Thaman, Europe’s New 
Jury Systems]. 
 14. See generally John H. Langbein, Torture and Plea Bargaining, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 3 
(1978). 
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as did the incompetence of defendants to testify in their own defense.15  
However, the Americans brought with them from England a great reverence 
for the privilege against self-incrimination, which stemmed from the fights of 
the Puritans and other dissidents against the inquisitorial courts of Star 
Chamber and the High Commission.16  The Americans eventually incorporated 
this protection into the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which 
provides: “No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a 
witness against himself . . . .”17 
Inasmuch as there was no right to appeal either convictions or acquittals in 
the United States until the end of the Nineteenth Century,18 there was no 
mechanism for judicial enforcement of the privilege against self-incrimination.  
Early cases do indicate, however, that coercive questioning by police19 was an 
area controlled by the Fifth Amendment, and statements that were the product 
of such coercion could be excluded.20  There appear to be two constants 
throughout American and European jurisprudence since torture was abolished 
on the European Continent.21  First, genuinely involuntary confessions 
obtained by means of torture or other force, violence, deception, promises or 
threats were in violation of the law and subject to a rigid exclusionary rule.  
Second, the police and other investigative authorities continued to use such 
tactics to induce confessions and admissions on the part of criminal suspects. 
In America, the U.S. Supreme Court was prevented by its own 
jurisprudence from addressing the problem of coerced confessions under the 
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination because it had not yet 
recognized that the amendment was binding on the states.22  It thus fashioned a 
“due process” test for the voluntariness of confessions and, between 1936 and 
1964, decided thirty-five confession cases arising from questionable police 
 
 15. See Moglen, supra note 10, at 114-17; Alschuler, supra note 7, at 198-99. 
 16. See Moglen, supra note 10, at 128-38 (noting that the high principles relating to the trials 
of the dissidents were ignored in trials of common criminals). 
 17. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 18. See United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 88 (1978). 
 19. The reputation of law enforcement in the early Twentieth Century was described by 
Justice Day in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). 
The tendency of those who execute the criminal laws of the country to obtain conviction 
by means of unlawful seizures and enforced confessions, the latter often obtained after 
subjecting accused persons to unwarranted practices destructive of rights secured by the 
Federal Constitution, should find no sanction in the judgments of the courts which are 
charged at all times with the support of the Constitution and to which people of all 
conditions have a right to appeal for the maintenance of such fundamental rights. 
Id. at 392. 
 20. See Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 557-58 (1897). 
 21. Judicial torture was abolished on the European Continent, by and large, in the mid-to-
late Eighteenth Century.  See LANGBEIN, TORTURE, supra note 5, at 10. 
 22. See Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 93 (1908). 
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tactics in interrogating suspects in state trials.23  These cases included out-and-
out torture,24 excessive length of interrogation,25 oppressive jail conditions 
used to pressure the suspect,26 and threats of violence and other undesired 
repercussions.27 
When the U.S. Supreme Court finally recognized that the Fifth 
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination was binding on the states,28 
the question of police interrogation of jailed suspects was again addressed in 
explicit Fifth Amendment terms.  In a 5-to-4 decision in Miranda v. Arizona,29 
the U.S. Supreme Court devised procedures “to assure that the individual is 
accorded his privilege under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution not to be 
compelled to incriminate himself.”30  The Court, noting that “police violence 
and the ‘third degree’ flourished” in the 1930s, stressed the primarily 
psychological strategies used by police to induce confessions at the time and 
referred to “various police manuals and texts” describing these tactics.31  After 
finding that “without proper safeguards the process of in-custody interrogation 
of persons suspected or accused of crime contains inherently compelling 
pressures which work to undermine the individual’s will to resist and to 
compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely,” the Supreme 
Court enunciated what are now known throughout the world as the “Miranda 
Warnings.”  The Miranda warnings are a prerequisite to any in-custody 
questioning by police officials: 
  Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to 
remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence 
against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either 
retained or appointed.  The defendant may waive effectuation of these rights 
provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.  If, 
 
 23. STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG & DANIEL J. CAPRA, AMERICAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 619 
(6th ed. 2000) [hereinafter SALTZBURG & CAPRA]. 
 24. See Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 281-82 (1936) (including among the various 
methods of torture repeated whippings and hanging from a tree). 
 25. See Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. l43, 150 (l944) (subjecting the defendant to thirty-
six hours of interrogation). 
 26. See Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 52-53 (l949) (involving sustained police pressure); 
Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 403 (l945) (stripping defendant naked); Haynes v. 
Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 507 (l963) (holding defendant incommunicado and denying phone 
calls). 
 27. See Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 564-65 (1958) (involving denial of food and threat 
of mob violence); Lynum v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528, 533 (l963) (threatening to cut off financial aid 
to children); Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 536 (1961) (threatening to bring in arthritic wife 
for questioning). 
 28. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964) (incorporating privilege against self-
incrimination through due process clause of Fourteenth Amendment). 
 29. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 30. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 439. 
 31. Id. at 446, 448. 
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however, he indicates in any manner and at any stage of the process that he 
wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking there can be no questioning.  
Likewise, if the individual is alone and indicates in any manner that he does 
not wish to be interrogated, the police may not question him.  The mere fact 
that he may have answered some questions or volunteered some statements on 
his own does not deprive him of the right to refrain from answering any further 
inquiries until he has consulted with an attorney and thereafter consents to be 
questioned.32 
The Miranda decision was a compromise between what one commentator 
called “two incompatible readings” of the Fifth Amendment guarantee: (1) that 
the “privilege is fulfilled only when the person is guaranteed the right ‘to 
remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own 
will,’” and (2) that the privilege “does not protect an accused’s ability to 
remain silent but instead protects him only from improper methods of 
interrogation.”33  The Miranda Court still allowed custodial interrogations by 
police officers without the presence of counsel, despite its finding of the 
inherent oppressive conditions attendant therein, as long as the person 
interrogated had been properly admonished and had waived the right to remain 
silent and the right to counsel.34  The Court also limited the requirement of 
warnings to custody cases.35 
Miranda was controversial when decided even though the majority pointed 
out that the most professional police force in the country, the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation, had been using Miranda-like admonitions for many years and 
had not found it to hamper criminal investigations.36  Not only was it a narrow 
5-to-4 decision, but the U.S. Congress tried to overrule the decision in 
legislation it passed two years later.37  This decision would have returned to the 
“voluntariness” test laid down by the U.S. Supreme Court in its pre-
incorporation jurisprudence from 1936 to 1964.  The statute was ignored by 
U.S. Attorneys and federal judges alike until, after prodding by Justice Scalia 
in a concurring opinion,38 the issue of the constitutionality of the federal statute 
 
 32. Id. at 467. 
 33. Alschuler, supra note 7, at 181-82. 
 34. The Court also indicated that the police need not “have a ‘station house lawyer’ present 
at all times to advise prisoners” and implicitly allowed the police not to summon a “court-
appointed” lawyer even if one was requested as long as they did not interrogate the suspect.  
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 474. 
 35. Id. at 478. 
 36. Id. at 483.  An English law of 1848, Jervis’s Act, provided that all prisoners, whether 
before or during trial, had to be admonished of their right to remain silent and that anything they 
did say could be used in evidence.  See Henry E. Smith, The Modern Privilege: Its Nineteenth-
Century Origins, in R.H. HELMHOLZ ET AL., THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION: ITS 
ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT 169-70 (1997). 
 37. 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (1994). 
 38. See Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 462 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
586 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 45:581 
reached the Supreme Court.  In Dickerson v. United States,39 the Supreme 
Court affirmed the rooting of the Miranda warnings in the Fifth Amendment 
and distanced itself from earlier caselaw which had called into question the 
constitutionality thereof and had referred to the warnings as “prophylactic” and 
“not themselves rights protected by the Constitution.”40 
Between 1966 and 2000, however, the Supreme Court handed down 
several rulings that called into question the constitutionality of the Miranda 
warnings.  These decisions have clarified and limited the applicability of the 
warnings and the remedy of exclusion of statements acquired in violation of 
Miranda.  The Supreme Court has ruled that statements taken in violation of 
Miranda may nevertheless be used by the prosecution to impeach the 
defendant if he testifies at trial in a manner contrary to his previous 
statements.41  The Court has also allowed the police and prosecution to use 
leads gleaned from statements taken in violation of Miranda to gather other 
evidence, even if the statement itself will not be usable at trial.42  The Court 
has even allowed the prosecution to use statements taken after proper Miranda 
warnings, although the police had interviewed the defendant earlier in violation 
of Miranda and had induced incriminating responses.43 
The result of these rulings is that police departments routinely interrogate 
suspects without giving them Miranda warnings, knowing that the information 
can be used for leads to impeach a testifying defendant (thus conceivably 
deterring him or her from testifying), or can be used if a subsequent statement 
is made confirming the earlier statement following proper warnings.44  The 
U.S. Supreme Court has also condoned explicit deception employed by the 
police to induce suspects to talk to police officers or their agents.  Undercover 
police officers or police informants may, for instance, interrogate an 
incarcerated suspect without giving him any warnings in his jail cell as long as 
the suspect is not aware that the interrogator is working for the police.45  The 
police or jailers may also refuse to tell an incarcerated suspect that he is 
represented by a lawyer and even prevent the lawyer from gaining access to the 
suspect.46  Although police officers must cease their attempts to interrogate a 
suspect if he or she invokes the right to remain silent or the right to counsel, 
the U.S. Supreme Court has held that the police may come back at a later time 
 
 39. 120 S. Ct. 2326 (2000). 
 40. Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. at 2333. 
 41. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226 (1971). 
 42. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 451-52 (1974). 
 43. Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 318 (1985). 
 44. See California Attorneys for Criminal Justice v. Butts, 195 F.3d 1039, 1049-50 (9th Cir. 
1999); People v. Peevy, 953 P.2d 1212, 1214 (Cal. 1998). 
 45. Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 300 (1990). 
 46. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986). 
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if the suspect has only invoked the right to remain silent.47  The police may not 
return to attempt to gain a waiver if the suspect invokes the right to counsel 
unless the suspect voluntarily initiates the subsequent conversation.48 
The U.S. Supreme Court has fashioned much stricter rules for police 
interrogations after the defendant has been officially charged.  Prior to 
Miranda, the Supreme Court had held that neither police nor their undercover 
operatives could question an indicted suspect, even if the defendant was out of 
custody and did not realize that his interrogator was a police agent.49  This 
seemingly ironclad rule that there be no police interrogation of an indicted 
defendant without counsel being present has, however, been somewhat 
loosened in later Supreme Court caselaw.  The Court has allowed, for instance, 
the surreptitious placing of “jailplants,” perhaps undercover police informants, 
into jail cells with indicted defendants, as long as they do not actively question 
the indicted person.50  It has also allowed police interrogation of indicted 
defendants following proper Miranda warnings as long as the indicted prisoner 
has not been arraigned or requested counsel.51  Finally, the U.S. Supreme 
Court has allowed questioning of indicted prisoners about crimes other than 
those for which they have been indicted.52 
This article will discuss the protections afforded criminal suspects and 
defendants overseas when faced with interrogation by police, prosecutors, 
investigating magistrates53 or judges of the investigation.54  It will compare the 
 
 47. Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 106-07 (1975). 
 48. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484 (1981).  It is important to note that the Supreme 
Court has held that “reinitiation” may be found where a suspect asks such things as: “What’s 
going to happen to me now?” See, e.g., Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1045 (1983).  The 
Edwards rule even applies to the interrogation of uncharged suspects as well as to other crimes 
for which they are not under arrest.  Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 677-78 (1988). 
 49. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 206 (1964). 
 50. United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 272 (1980); Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 
460 (1986). 
 51. See Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 297 (1988).  Compare Michigan v. Jackson, 475 
U.S. 625, 626 (1986), in which the defendant had been arraigned and requested counsel. 
 52. See McNeill v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 176 (1991).  Even “jailplants” may be active in 
their surreptitious interrogations of incarcerated, indicted defendants about such “other crimes.” 
See Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 180 (1985). 
 53. The “investigating magistrate” is a legally trained official who is a member of the 
judiciary and is entrusted with investigating serious criminal cases in a number of overseas 
jurisdictions.  The main countries emphasized in this study that still have investigating 
magistrates are France, Spain and the Netherlands.  This figure is generally derived from the 
French juge d’instruction, the dominant investigating official in the old European inquisitorial 
systems.  For a discussion of this key figure in the inquisitorial mode of criminal investigation, 
see JEAN PRADEL, PROCÉDURE PÉNALE 26-31 (9th ed. 1997) [hereinafter PRADEL]. 
 54. I use the term “judges of the investigation” for the judge who has competence during 
pretrial proceedings to authorize invasions of privacy and personal integrity (searches, seizures, 
wiretaps, etc.), and to conduct depositions or interrogate defendants in countries which have 
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admonitions given to such suspects with those provided in the Miranda 
decision and discuss their constitutional, or statutory status.  It will further 
discuss when such admonitions must be given, to what extent the police or 
other officials may re-admonish after the right to silence or counsel has been 
invoked, and whether statements taken in violation of such admonitions or the 
fruits thereof may be used in court, or for the purpose of conducting further 
investigations or prosecuting third parties.  In a brief conclusion, this article 
assesses what we can learn from this comparison of U.S. law with that of other 
democratic countries with systems derived from the inquisitorial model.  The 
comparison will focus primarily on England, France, Germany, Italy, Russia 
and Spain. 
II. THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION IN EUROPE 
This study will not concern itself with the constitutional provisions and 
laws protecting suspects and defendants against being coerced to give 
statements by law enforcement officials.  The use of torture as a means of 
gathering evidence was abolished long ago in Europe55 and is, along with other 
cruel and inhuman treatment, prohibited by national constitutions56 and 
international human rights conventions.57  Any use of such measures would in 
all civilized countries lead to exclusion of any statement obtained thereby.58 
 
abolished the “investigating magistrate,” such as Germany and Italy. This term was used by the 
French Commission on Criminal Justice and Human Rights in its 1991 report.  See COMMISSION 
JUSTICE PÉNALE ET DROITS DE L’HOMME, LA MISE EN ÉTAT DES AFFAIRES PÉNALES: RAPPORTS 
31 (Fr. 1991) [hereinafter LA MISE EN ÉTAT DES AFFAIRES PÉNALES]. 
 55. See supra note 21. 
 56. See CONSTITUCIÓN ESPAÑOLA [C.E.] art. 15 [hereinafter C.E.-Spain], translated by 
author from JULIO MUERZA ESPARZA, LEY DE ENJUICIAMIENTO CRIMINAL Y OTRAS NORMAS 
PROCESALES 15-25 (1998) [hereinafter MUERZA ESPARZA]; COSTITUZIONE DE LA REPUBLICA 
ITALIANA [COST.] art. 13 para. 4, art. 27 para. 2 [hereinafter COST.-Italy], translated by author 
from GIUSTINO GATTI ET AL., CODICE PÉNALE E DI PROCÉDURA PÉNALE 9-49 (Giuridiche 
Simone ed., 1999) [hereinafter GATTI ET AL.]; KONSTITUTSIIA ROSSIYSKOY FEDERATSII [KONST. 
RF 1993] art. 21(2) [hereinafter KONST. RF-RUSSIA], translated by author from B.N. TOPORNIN 
ET AL., KONSTITUTSIIA ROSSIYSKOY FEDERATSII: KOMMENTARIY (1994) [hereinafter TOPORNIN 
ET AL.]. 
 57. See UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS art. 5; INTERNATIONAL COVENANT 
ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS; CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL, 
INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT art. 7.  For a collection of these texts, 
see M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE: A COMPENDIUM OF UNITED NATIONS NORMS AND STANDARDS 21-39 
(1994) [hereinafter BASSIOUNI]; EUROPEAN CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS art. 3 (1950), available at http://conventions.coe.int/ 
treaty/EN/Treaties/html/005.htm [hereinafter ECHR]. 
 58. For example, the German Code of Criminal Procedure, provides: 
(1) The suspect’s freedom to make decisions or exercise his will may not be impaired 
through maltreatment, fatigue, physical intervention, the administration of substances, 
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Furthermore, the study will not deal with procedures for compelling a 
criminal suspect to testify under oath, a compulsion enforced by the threat of a 
prosecution for perjury or contempt.59 Neither police, prosecutors, 
investigating magistrates nor judges of the investigation may compel a suspect 
to declare against his own interests in England or on the European Continent 
unless a kind of immunity is granted.60  Indeed, in most continental European 
countries an accused or a criminal defendant61 is never placed under oath, 
whether he is declaring to a public prosecutor, a magistrate or judge, or in a 
trial before judge, jury or mixed court.62 
Despite the fact that no compulsion is allowed and no oath administered, 
continental European jurisdictions used to require the investigating authority to 
 
through torture, deception or hypnosis.  Force may only be applied to the extent allowed 
by the law of criminal procedure.  The threat of any measure which is not applicable 
according to the rules, or the promise of a benefit not provided by law are prohibited; (2) 
Measures which impair the suspect’s capacity for memory or the capability of exercising 
insight are not permitted; (3) The prohibitions of paragraphs 1 and 2 apply regardless of 
the consent of the suspect.  Statements which are made as a result of the violation of this 
prohibition may not be used, even if the suspect agrees to said use. 
STRAFPROZEßORDNUNG [StPO] § 136a [hereinafter StPO-GERMANY], translated by author from 
THEODOR KLEINKNECHT & LUTZ MEYER-GOßNER, STRAFPROZEßORDNUNG (43d ed. 1997) 
[hereinafter KLEINKNECHT & MEYER-GOßNER].  See also CODICE DI PROCEDURA PENALE 
[C.P.P.] § 64(3) [hereinafter C.P.P.-ITALY], translated by author from GATTI ET AL., supra note 
56. 
  For the detailed English legislation regulating the conditions of custodial interrogation in 
England, see Code of Practice C. Police and Criminal Evidence Act, 1984, §§ 12.2-12.5, 12.7 
[hereinafter PACE-England], cited in STEPHEN SEABROOKE & JOHN SPRACK, CRIMINAL 
EVIDENCE AND PROCEDURE: THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK (1996) [hereinafter SEABROOKE & 
SPRACK]. 
 59. Such compulsion, called the “cruel trilemma” by the U.S. Supreme Court, in Murphy v. 
Waterfront Commission of N.Y. Harbors, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964), forces a guilty suspect to risk 
either self-incrimination and punishment, contempt or perjury prosecution. 
 60. According to Section 2 of England’s Criminal Justice Act of 1987, it is a crime, 
punishable by up to six-months imprisonment, to refuse to answer questions pursuant to an 
investigation by the Serious Fraud Office.  The answers to such questions may not be used by the 
prosecution except to impeach the defendant when he testifies differently at trial.  Similar powers 
to compel testimony are enjoyed by the Department of Trade and Industry Inspectors under other 
legislation.  See THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE: REPORT 56-57 (1993) 
[hereinafter RCCJ REPT.]. 
 61. I shall use the term “suspect” for a person arrested by the police but against whom 
criminal proceedings have not yet been officially initiated through the filing of a complaint.  The 
term “accused” shall refer to someone against whom criminal proceedings have been initiated, 
but who has not yet been held to answer in the trial court.  The term “defendant” shall refer to a 
person who has been bound over for trial. 
 62. Cf. StPO-GERMANY § 60(2); LEY DE ENJUICIAMIENTO CRIMINAL [L.E.CRIM.] § 387, 
[hereinafter L.E.CRIM-SPAIN], translated by author from MUERZA ESPARZA, supra note 56. 
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interrogate the suspect-accused.63  These jurisdictions considered it to be a 
protection for accused persons to be able to speak and give their sides of the 
story.64  Indeed, the old continental European statutes seldom contained 
explicit references to any right of the accused to remain silent, but rather 
emphasized, his or her right to make a statement.65 
Despite the fact that Spain is still using a Code of Criminal Procedure from 
1882, Germany from 1877, France from 1955 and Russia from 1966, 
amendments and new constitutions (Germany in 1949, Spain in 1978 and 
Russia in 1993) have led to substantial alterations of the old inquisitorial mode 
of questioning suspects and the accused.  The Spanish Constitution provides in 
Article 24, Section 2 that all persons have the “right . . . not to declare against 
themselves and not to confess guilt . . . .”66  It further provides in Article 17, 
Section 3: 
[E]very detained person shall be informed immediately and in a 
comprehensible form, of his rights and the reasons for his detention, without 
being obligated to make a declaration.  The assistance of a lawyer is 
guaranteed to the detained person during police and judicial investigative 
measures in the terms the law establishes.67 
The Russian Constitution of 1993 contains similar guarantees.68 
 
 63. L.E.CRIM-SPAIN § 385; StPO-GERMANY § 163a(1).  See also KLEINKNECHT & MEYER-
GOßNER, supra note 58, at 612. 
 64. PRADEL, supra note 53, at 357.  The French have traditionally viewed the involvement 
of an independent judge as being a better safeguard than an abstract right of silence.  See Richard 
Vogler, Criminal Procedure in France, in JOHN HATCHARD ET AL., COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE 31 (1996) [hereinafter Vogler].  American criminal defendants probably also view 
the constitutional right to indictment by grand jury, guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment of the 
U.S. Constitution, as being a mixed blessing. 
 65. See UGOLOVNO-PROTSESSUAL’NYI KODEKS RF [UPK RF] §§ 46, 54 (October 27, 1960) 
[hereinafter UPK RF-RUSSIA], translated by author from 2 SBORNIK KODEKSOV ROSSIYSKOY 
FEDERATSII (1999).  In outlining the rights of accuseds and suspects, the Russian Code of 
Criminal Procedure mentions the rights “to know what he is being accused of,” to “give 
explanations as to the accusation presented him,” and to “present evidence.”  The Code does not 
mention a right to silence.  Cf. L.E.CRIM-SPAIN §§ 396, 400. 
 66. See MUERZA ESPARZA, supra note 56, at 18. 
 67. Id. at 16-17.  As a result of these constitutional provisions the old inquisitorial provisions 
of the Spanish Code of Criminal Procedure, such as Section 387, which has the investigating 
magistrate “exhort” suspects “to tell the truth” in a “precise, clear and truthful manner,” have 
been ruled to be unconstitutional.  See VICENTE GIMENO SENDRA ET AL., DERECHO PROCESAL 
PENAL 395-96 (1996) [hereinafter VICENTE GIMENO SENDRA ET AL.]. 
 68. Article 51(1) of the Russian Constitution provides: “No one is obliged to be a witness 
against himself . . . .”  Article 49(2) provides: “The defendant is not obliged to prove his 
innocence.”  Article 48(2) provides: “Every person arrested, preventively detained or accused of 
having committed a crime has the right to make use of the services of a lawyer (defense counsel) 
from the moment, respectively, of arrest, preventive detention or the filing of a criminal 
complaint.”  See TOPORNIN ET AL., supra note 56, at 260, 265 & 274. 
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III. ADVISEMENT OF RIGHTS BEFORE POLICE INTERROGATION IN 
COMPARATIVE LAW 
A. Introduction 
Given that modern constitutions and criminal procedure codes guarantee 
both the right to remain silent and the protection against techniques used to 
compel self-incrimination, it remains to be seen how these rights are 
interpreted in the context of police interrogations.  The police play different 
roles in different criminal justice systems.  In common law systems such as 
those in England and the United States, the police are the main criminal 
investigators and, as such, the main interrogators of criminal suspects.  In post-
inquisitorial systems the primary duties of the police are to arrest suspects, 
secure the crime scene and evidence and interview eyewitnesses.69  The case is 
then turned over to the public prosecutor who, depending on the country and 
the type of crime investigated, either investigates the case herself or turns it 
over to an investigating magistrate,70 or sends the case immediately to the trial 
court pursuant to procedures providing for expedited, abbreviated or simplified 
trials.71 
If the public prosecutor or the investigating magistrate then agrees to 
initiate criminal proceedings, he or she has the power or even the duty to again 
examine witnesses and to interrogate the accused.  In nearly all continental 
European systems the police are permitted to interrogate the suspect before 
turning the case over to the official investigator.  Often the role of the official 
investigator (whether public prosecutor or investigating magistrate) the judge 
of the investigation is to give the accused a chance to either confirm or retract 
the confession or admission given to the police.  While the official investigator 
may delegate the judicial police to conduct further investigative measures 
through what is called a rogatory commission, this often does not involve 
interrogation of the accused.72 
Of special significance on the European continent is French procedure, 
which allows the police, prior to the initiation of criminal proceedings, to hold 
a suspect for up to forty-eight hours in what is called “watched custody” or 
 
 69. See C.P.P.-ITALY §§ 347-55, StPO-GERMANY § 163(1), L.E.CRIM-SPAIN § 282. 
 70. See C.P.P.-ITALY § 347; StPO-GERMANY § 163(2); L.E.CRIM-SPAIN §§ 284, 286; CODE 
DE PROCÉDURE PÉNALE [C. PR. PÉN.] §§ 54-57 [hereinafter C. PR. PÉN.-FRANCE], translated by 
author, unless otherwise noted, from CODE DE PROCÉDURE PÉNALE (Dalloz ed., 42d ed. 2001). 
 71. For some comments on the Italian and French procedures, see Stephen C. Thaman, 
Symposium on Prosecuting Transnational Crimes: Cross-Cultural Insights for the Former Soviet 
Union, 27 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 1, 5-9 (2000) (commenting on issues of plea-bargaining 
and witness immunity). 
 72. In Italy, the public prosecutor may delegate the judicial police to do interrogations when 
the suspect is out of custody and a lawyer is present.  These interrogations must be proceeded by 
admonitions of the right to silence and other rights.  C.P.P.-ITALY § 370(1). 
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garde à vue.73  Amendments to the French Penal Code in May 2000, however, 
have greatly expanded the rights accorded suspects during garde à vue.74 
What follows is an examination of the protective safeguards antecedent to 
police questioning in key European jurisdictions and a discussion of any 
additional safeguards provided during the official interrogations by judges or 
prosecutors that follow. 
B. Admonitions Required Prior to Police Interrogation 
1. Italy 
The Italian Code of Criminal Procedure of 1988 contains the most radical 
protections for criminal suspects when confronted with interrogation, whether 
by police, public prosecutors or judicial authorities.  In general, a suspect must 
always be admonished as to the right to remain silent, regardless of who is 
doing the questioning.75  The rules governing interrogations by the judicial 
police, who are only authorized to gather so-called summary information, 
provide: 
2. Before gathering the summary information, the judicial police invite the 
accused to name a defense lawyer or, where this is not done, to proceed 
according to the provisions of Section 97(3) [relating to official appointment of 
lawyers]. 
3. The summary information must be gathered in the presence of the defense 
lawyer, whom the judicial police must give timely notice.  The defense lawyer 
is obliged to be present when the procedure is conducted. 
4. If the defense lawyer is not located or does not appear, the judicial police 
request the public prosecutor to proceed according to Section 97(4) [relating to 
official appointment of a lawyer]. 
5. At the scene of the crime or in emergency situations the officials of the 
judicial police may, even in the absence of a defense lawyer, gather from the 
accused, even if he has been arrested in flagrante . . . information and tips 
useful for achieving the immediate goals of the investigation. 
6. No record or use may be made of the information and tips gathered in the 
absence of defense counsel at the scene of the crime or in emergency situations 
pursuant to paragraph five. 
 
 73. C. PR. PÉN.-FRANCE § 77, para. 1. 
 74. Law No. 2000-516 of June 5, 2000, J.O. Num. 138, June 16, 2000, p. 9038 (reinforcing 
the protection of the presumption of innocence and the rights of the victim). 
 75. C.P.P.-ITALY §§ 64(3), 65(2). 
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7. The judicial police may also receive spontaneous declarations from the 
accused, but they may not be used in the trial, except pursuant to the provisions 
of Article 503(3) [relating to impeachment].76 
In Italy, not only must the suspect be advised of the right to remain silent, but 
any statement taken in the absence of counsel may not be used in court.  
Therefore, the suspect-accused is not a source of evidence for the prosecution.  
According to the Italian Code of Criminal Procedure, during any interrogation: 
“the person is then invited to explain to the extent he deems it useful for his 
defense . . . .”77 
The institutional mistrust of the police as gatherers of evidence evinced by 
the Italian legislature in the Code of Criminal Procedure was apparent 
elsewhere.  Another provision of the Code prevents police from testifying in 
court as to prior statements they had taken even when offered as prior 
inconsistent statements to impeach a testifying witness.78  The advisement of 
the right to remain silent also applies, of course, to interrogations by the public 
prosecutor79 and to interrogations by the judge of the investigation.80 
2. Spain 
The Spanish legislature amended the Code of Criminal Procedure in 1978.  
These amendments made the code provisions conform to the aforementioned 
constitutional provisions81 and transformed Spain’s formerly inquisitorial 
approach to the interrogation of suspects and accuseds.  The result was the 
following section prescribing the admonitions that must be given to suspects-
accuseds under arrest or preventive detention: 
Every person detained or imprisoned will be informed in a comprehensible 
mode and immediately of the acts of which he is accused and the reasons for 
the deprivation of his liberty, as well as the rights he possesses, especially the 
following: 
(a) The right to remain silent and not to speak if he does not want to, and not to 
respond to any of the questions which are formulated, or to state that he only 
wants to declare in front of a judge. 
 
 76. C.P.P.-ITALY § 350(2)–(7). 
 77. C.P.P.-ITALY § 65(1) para.1. 
 78. C.P.P.-ITALY § 195(4) provides: “The officials and agents of the judicial police may not 
testify to the content of declarations acquired from witnesses.”  However, this provision was 
declared unconstitutional by the Italian Constitutional Court.  See Corte cost., sez. un., 31 jan. 
1992, n.24, Giur. It. 37, 114. 
 79. C.P.P.-ITALY §§ 294(6), 364, 388. 
 80. C.P.P.-ITALY §§ 294(4), 302, 391; see generally Vittorio Grevi, Diritto al silenzio ed 
esigenze cautelari nella disciplina della libertà personale dell’imputato, in LIBERTÀ PERSONALE 
E RICERCA DELLA PROVA NELL’ATTUALE ASSETTO DELLE INDAGINI PRELIMINARI 9-10 (1995). 
 81. See supra text accompanying notes 66 and 67. 
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(b) The right not to give a statement against oneself and not to confess guilt. 
(c) The right to designate a lawyer and to request his presence to help during 
the police and judicial interrogations and to intervene in any identification 
procedure no matter what its object.  If the detained person or prisoner does 
not designate a lawyer, one will be officially designated.82 
Although an accused in Spain has a right to have counsel present during an 
interrogation by the investigating magistrate, the Spanish Constitutional Court 
has ruled that the accused may waive this right if he is not in custody and has 
been properly admonished.83 
3. Germany 
In 1964, two years before the Miranda decision, the German Code of 
Criminal Procedure was amended to provide for the following admonitions, 
which apply to interrogations by a judge, a prosecutor or the police.84 
At the beginning of the first interrogation the accused must be notified as to the 
act which has been attributed to him and which penal provisions are 
implicated.  He must be advised, that the law permits him, either to respond to 
the accusation or to say nothing in relation to the case, and at any time, even 
before his interrogation, to ask questions of a named defense lawyer.  He must 
also be advised, that he can move to introduce particular items of evidence to 
exonerate himself.  In appropriate cases the accused should be advised that he 
can give a written statement.85 
Unlike in Italy and Spain, however, a suspect-accused in Germany has no right 
to have his lawyer present during police interrogation.86  During interrogations 
by the public prosecutor or the judge of the investigation, however, the 
defendant has a right to have his lawyer present.87 
 
 82. L.E.CRIM.-SPAIN § 520(2)(a-c). 
 83. S.T.C., Dec. 13, 1999 (10 ACTUALIDAD PENAL, NO. 10, 405). 
 84. See Claus Roxin, Über die Reform des deutschen Strafprozeßrechts, in FESTSCHRIFT 
FÜR GERD JAUCH ZUM 65 GEBURTSTAG 184 (l990) [hereinafter Roxin]. 
 85. StPO-GERMANY § 136(1); Section 163(4) of the German Code of Criminal Procedure 
makes Section 136(1) explicitly applicable to the first interrogation of a suspect by police 
officers. German courts have held that, though the words of the statute should be used in the 
admonition, a statement will not be excluded if police officers use another version that clearly 
explains the privilege against self-incrimination.  See KLEINKNECHT & MEYER-GOßNER, supra 
note 58, §8, at 466.  The Miranda decision itself allows for “fully effective equivalents” of the 
admonitions laid out by the Court.  Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. 
 86. The only way a suspect can ensure the presence of counsel during interrogation is to 
refuse to speak at all while in police custody.  See Barbara Huber, Criminal Procedure in 
Germany, in JOHN HATCHARD ET AL., COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 121 (1996).  The 
Miranda court also did not obligate police interrogators to provide lawyers for suspects while in 
custody.  Miranda, 384 U.S. at 474. 
 87. KLEINKNECHT & MEYER-GOßNER, supra note 58, at 615 (§ 20). 
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4. France 
Until recently, suspects in French criminal cases had arguably the least 
protection in the face of police interrogation in Western Europe.  Not only 
were suspects not advised that they had a right to remain silent, but they were 
only advised after the expiration of twenty-four hours in garde à vue that they 
could speak to a lawyer.88  Pursuant to a law passed on June 15, 2000, 
“reinforcing the protection of the presumption of innocence and the rights of 
the victim,” the provisions regulating police interrogation in garde à vue now 
read: 
  Every person placed in watched custody (garde à vue) shall be 
immediately informed by an officer of the judicial police or, under his control, 
by an agent of the judicial police, of the nature of the offense as to which the 
investigation is being conducted, of the rights mentioned in Articles 63-2, 63-3 
and 63-4 as well as the provisions relating to the length of garde à vue 
provided in Art. 63.  The person in garde à vue shall also be immediately 
informed that she has the right not to respond to questions which are asked by 
the interrogators.”89 
  From the beginning of watched custody, up until the expiration of twenty 
hours, the person may request to speak with a lawyer.  If she is not able to 
designate one, or if the lawyer she has chosen cannot be contacted, she can 
demand that one be appointed by the Bar. 
  The Bar is notified of this demand by every possible means and without 
delay. 
  The designated lawyer may communicate with the person in garde à vue 
under conditions which guarantee the confidentiality of the meeting. He is 
informed by the officer of the judicial police or, under his control, by an agent 
of the judicial police, of the nature and the presumed date of the offense as to 
which the investigation is being conducted. 
  At the conclusion of the meeting, which may not exceed thirty minutes, the 
lawyer may in appropriate cases submit written observations which are made a 
part of the record.  The lawyer may not make this meeting known to anyone 
for the duration of watched custody.90 
Although the 2000 amendments have improved the position of the suspect 
who is subject to police interrogation by providing for admonitions of the right 
to refuse to answer questions and by allowing access to a lawyer before the 
interrogation begins, the regime is still less protective than those in place in 
 
 88. See former C. PR. PÉN.-FRANCE §§ 63-1, 63-4. 
 89. C. PR. PÉN.-FRANCE § 63-1, as amended by Law No. 2000-516 of June 5, 2000, 
discussed supra note 74. 
 90. C. PR. PÉN.-FRANCE § 63-4, as amended by Law No. 2000-516 of June 5, 2000, 
discussed supra note 74. 
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Italy, Spain and Germany.  The suspect still does not have the right to have her 
lawyer present during the interrogation.91  Furthermore, the French Code of 
Criminal Procedure does not provide for an absolute right to remain silent.  
Rather, it provides a privilege not to answer specific questions, much like the 
privilege enjoyed by witnesses testifying at another’s trial or before a grand 
jury in the United States. 
Though French accuseds have had a right to counsel during interrogations 
by the investigating magistrate since 1897,92 counsel, after having consulted 
with the accused, remains silent during the interrogation.93  From 1993 through 
2000, however, the investigating magistrate was under no obligation to advise 
an accused of the right to remain silent before conducting the interrogation.94 
5. England and Wales 
In England and Wales, the law provides for a system of “duty solicitors,” 
lawyers who are present in the jailhouse and are able to confer with arrested 
prisoners at any time.95  Arrestees should be immediately informed pursuant to 
section 58(1) of the Code of Practice C. Police and Criminal Evidence Act 
(PACE) which provides: “A person who is in police detention shall be entitled, 
if he so requests, to consult a solicitor privately at any time.”  Before 1995, an 
arrested suspect had to be cautioned that he did not have to say anything unless 
he wished to, but that anything he said could be used as evidence against him.  
This changed with the passage of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act of 
1994 (CJPOA) which introduced the following modified admonitions or 
“cautions”: 
A person whom there are grounds to suspect of an offence must be cautioned 
before any questions about it (or further questions if it is his answers to 
previous questions that provide grounds for suspicion) are put to him for the 
purpose of obtaining evidence which may be given to a court in a 
prosecution.96 
. . . 
The caution shall be in the following terms: “You do not have to say anything. 
But it may harm your defence if you do not mention, when questioned, 
something which you later rely on in court. Anything you do say may be given 
 
 91. See PRADEL, supra note 53, at 397 
 92. Id. at 537. 
 93. LA MISE EN ÉTAT DES AFFAIRES PÉNALES, supra note 54, at 56. 
 94. Vogler, supra note 64, at 32. 
 95. See Richard Hatchard, Criminal Procedure in England and Wales, in JOHN HATCHARD 
ET AL., COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 193 (1996) [hereinafter Hatchard, Criminal 
Procedure in England and Wales]. 
 96. PACE-England § 10.1. 
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in evidence.  Minor deviations do not constitute a breach of this requirement 
provided that the sense of the caution is preserved.97 
The CJPOA reauthorized the prosecutor, jury or judge to use an arrested 
person’s silence at trial, overturning an 1898 law which prevented such use.98  
While the regime of duty solicitors does effectively allow jailed suspects to 
talk to a lawyer before police questioning,99 unlike in the United States where 
the police are under no obligations to facilitate such a meeting,100 the 
admonitions as to possible use or comment on the exercise of the right to 
silence certainly provides less protection than the Miranda warnings in the 
United States.101 
6. Russia 
Although neither the Russian Constitution, nor the Russian Code of 
Criminal Procedure, Ugolovno-Protsessual’nyi Kodeks RF, is explicit about 
whether the police must admonish suspects as to their constitutional rights to 
counsel and to remain silent prior to police interrogation,102 the practice of 
doing so was developed by trial courts after the re-introduction of trial by jury 
in nine Russian regions in 1993 and 1994.103  In a 1996 advisory ruling, the 
Russian Supreme Court approved the practice.104 
7. Other Countries 
In the Netherlands, the police may hold a suspect for six hours for the 
purpose of interrogation, and this period may be extended for up to seventy-
two hours with the consent of the prosecutor.  The Dutch do, however, strictly 
require that suspects be admonished of the right to remain silent.105  The 
Supreme Court of Canada has also held that a defendant must be advised of the 
right to counsel and the right to remain silent, since “the most important 
function of legal advice upon detention is to ensure that the accused 
 
 97. PACE-England § 10.4. 
 98. The Criminal Evidence Act 1898, discussed in Hatchard, Criminal Procedure in 
England and Wales, supra note 95, at 190. 
 99. See RCCJ REPT., supra note 60, §§ 57, 59, at 37-38 (discussing criticism of duty 
solicitors who are perceived as being too closely tied to the police agencies). 
 100. Police may even deceive lawyers to prevent them from trying to see in-custody suspects.  
See Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 427 (1986). 
 101. See Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 619 (1976) (commenting on a suspect’s invocation of 
his or her Miranda rights constitutes a violation of due process). 
 102. See discussion of the provisions of the Russian Constitution, supra note 68. 
 103. See Stephen C. Thaman, The Resurrection of Trial by Jury in Russia, 31 STAN. J. INT’L 
L. 61, 91-92 (1995) [hereinafter Thaman, Resurrection]. 
 104. Thaman, Europe’s New Jury Systems, supra note 13, at 242 n.47. 
 105. Stewart Field et al., Prosecutors, Examining Judges, and Control of Police 
Investigations, in PHIL FENNELL ET AL., CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN EUROPE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 
232 n.26 (1995) [hereinafter Field]. 
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understands his rights, chief among which is his right to silence.”106  Finally, 
the German Supreme Court noted, in a survey of comparative law undertaken 
in 1992, that admonitions as to the privilege against self-incrimination must 
also be given in Denmark.107 
C. Timing of the Warnings 
Whereas the Miranda warnings only apply once a suspect has been “taken 
into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant 
way,”108 several European countries require warnings relating to the right to 
remain silent as soon as the criminal investigation focuses on a person as a 
possible suspect.109  In a 1992 case, the German Supreme Court explicitly held 
that admonitions as to the right to remain silent apply to an out-of-custody 
suspect who is confronted by the police on the streets and suspected of having 
crashed his automobile while under the influence of alcohol.110  While 
acknowledging the “special importance” of the Miranda decision, the court 
noted the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Berkemer v. McCarty,111 which 
held that Miranda warnings do not apply to out-of-custody automobile stops 
even when the person is under temporary detention.  The German Supreme 
Court declined to follow Berkemer, however, emphasizing the broader 
applicability of the German admonitions.112  In Italy as well, the suspect-
accused, whether in or out of custody, has the same rights,113 including the 
right not to be interrogated by police in the absence of counsel and without 
having been advised of the right to remain silent.114 
In England and Wales, the “cautions,” though admittedly promising less 
protection than the Miranda warnings, apply to out-of-custody suspects.115  
 
 106. R. v. Herbert 77 C.R.3d 145, discussed in CRAIG M. BRADLEY, THE FAILURE OF THE 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE REVOLUTION 114 (1993) [hereinafter BRADLEY]. 
 107. BGHSt 38, 215 (229-30). 
 108. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. 
 109. A “focus” test was applied in Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490-91 (1964), in 
deciding when the Sixth Amendment right to counsel would apply in the context of police 
investigation.  The test still, however, required that the person under focus be in police custody. 
 110. BGHSt 38, 215 (218). 
 111. 468 U.S. 420, 440 (1984). 
 112. BGHSt 38, 215 (230).  For an opinion that the restriction of warnings to custodial 
situations is not in conformity with notions of procedural fairness as accepted in international 
law, see Wilfried Bottke, ‘Rule of Law’ or ‘Due Process’ as a Common Feature of Criminal 
Process in Western Democratic Societies, 51 U. PITT. L. REV. 419, 447-48 (1990). 
 113. C.P.P.-ITALY § 61. 
 114. See Stephen P. Freccero, An Introduction to the New Italian Criminal Procedure, 21 AM. 
J. CRIM. L.  345, 360 (1994). 
 115. R. v. Nelson and Rose, Crim.L.R. 814, 815 (C.A. 1998).  The Court held that warnings 
had to be given to the defendant, who was carrying a briefcase customs officials suspected 
contained false compartments, before he was questioned about the briefcase. 
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English courts have even held that undercover police officers or informants 
may not do pointed questioning of suspects in the field without giving the 
“cautions.” 
In our view, although the Code [Code C] extends beyond the treatment of 
those in detention, what is clear is that it was intended to protect suspects who 
are vulnerable to abuse or pressure from police officers or who may believe 
themselves to be so.  Frequently, the suspect will be a detainee.  But the Code 
will also apply where a suspect, not in detention, is being questioned about an 
offence by a police officer acting as a police officer for the purpose of 
obtaining evidence. In that situation, the officer and the suspect are not on 
equal terms.  The officer is perceived to be in a position of authority; the 
suspect may be intimidated or undermined.116 
In R v. Christou & Wright,117 a case involving a police sting operation to 
nab dealers in stolen property, the Court held that warnings would not have 
been required.  A subsequent case, however, cited the language favorably in 
holding that it did apply to a police undercover officer who was negotiating to 
purchase a stolen car from the defendant, and proceeded to interrogate the 
defendant as to when he had stolen the car.118 
From the terms of Section 520(2) of the Spanish Code of Criminal 
Procedure, it appears that the statutory admonitions apply only when someone 
has been detained or otherwise placed in custody.  In the United States, a 
person must be in custody and subject to interrogation for the Miranda rights 
to be obligatory.119 
Continental European codes of criminal procedure distinguish 
meticulously between procedures for police or judicial interviews of witnesses 
and those that apply to suspects or accuseds.  Police and other investigators 
admonish witnesses routinely that they are obliged to give a statement under 
penalty of perjury,120 whereas the privilege against self-incrimination prevents 
compelling a suspect to speak in such a manner. 
If a police officer, who actually has grounds to suspect a person of having 
committed a crime, obliges him to give a statement “as a witness,” all 
 
 116. R. v. Christou & Wright, 3 W.L.R. 228 (1992). 
 117. 3 W.L.R. 228 (1992). 
 118. R. v. Bryce, 4 All E.R. 567, 571-73 (1992).  The Court suppressed the defendant’s 
answers due to the lack of cautions. 
 119. Conversations between police officers that are not “reasonably likely to induce an 
incriminating response” do not constitute “interrogation.”  Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 
302 (1980); Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 601 (1990) (booking questions). 
 120. On the obligation of witnesses to testify in Italy, see C.P.P.-ITALY § 198.  With regard to 
the same obligation in France, see C. PR. PÉN.-FRANCE §§ 105, 109; and PRADEL, supra note 53, 
at 348.  On the swearing of witnesses under penalty of perjury in Germany, see StPO-GERMANY 
§ 57.  On the obligation to testify under oath in Spain, see L.E.CRIM.-SPAIN §§ 410, 434. 
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European jurisdictions will suppress such a statement.121  In Spain, the 
Constitutional Court has held that an investigating magistrate may not question 
“as a witness” an out-of-custody person “as to whom can be attributed, more or 
less well-founded, a punishable act.”  In such cases, he must be permitted “to 
exercise the right to defense with the broadest content.”  Commenting on the 
“old inquisitory procedure,” the Spanish Constitutional Court stated: 
The investigating magistrate questioned without communicating what he was 
looking for and could interrogate a suspect without letting him know what and 
why he was suspected, without making self-defense possible and without 
providing him with the assistance of a lawyer in a way that the interrogation 
could induce the declarant to make assertions prejudicial to him, including 
involuntary self-incrimination which could have been avoided in another type 
of interrogation.  The Constitution of 1978 and the reform of the Code of 
Criminal Procedure of the same year are not compatible with these vestiges of 
the old inquisitorial procedure.122 
The Russian Constitutional Court has also recently condemned a practice 
whereby Russian police arrest suspects as “witnesses” and then question them 
without warnings or the assistance of counsel.123  The Court declared Section 
47, paragraph 1, of the Code of Criminal Procedure to be unconstitutional 
because it restricted the right to counsel to those who had been charged, or to 
detained persons as to whom an order of preventive detention had been 
issued.124 
According to the German Supreme Court, the admonitions of Section 136 
of the Code of Criminal Procedure125 must be given “when the suspicion 
already present at the beginning of the interrogation has so thickened, that the 
interrogated person can seriously be considered as a perpetrator of the 
investigated crime.”126  German jurisprudence distinguishes between 
“interrogations” and “informational questioning.”  If police are only inquiring 
to determine if there is sufficient evidence that a crime was committed and are 
questioning people at the scene to determine whether they were witnesses or 
perpetrators, no warnings are necessary.  Otherwise, the solemnity of the 
 
 121. See 1989 Bull. Crim. No. 258 (discussing France’s practice in this regard); see also 
PRADEL, supra note 53, at 536. 
 122. S.T.C., July 19, 1989 (B.J.C., No.135, 1130, 1135-36). 
 123. Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 2000, No. 27, Art. No. 2882 (Constitutional Court of the RF June 
27, 2000), available at http://ks.rfnet.ru/pos/p11_00.html.  For a critique of this practice in the 
first cases tried in the modern Russian jury courts, see Thaman, Resurrection, supra note 103, at 
91. 
 124. Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 2000, No. 27, Art. No. 2882 (Constitutional Court of the RF June 
27, 2000), available at http://ks.rfnet.ru/pos/p11_00.html. 
 125. See text accompanying supra note 85. 
 126. BGH StV 8, 337 (338). 
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warnings would risk treating completely innocent people as suspects and deter 
them from cooperating with the police in the future.127 
Police in England and the Netherlands get around giving the Miranda-type 
warnings by engaging in “informal chats” in suspects’ homes just after arrest, 
during searches, in the police car on the way to the station, or in interview 
rooms just before formal interrogations are to begin.128  The Dutch Supreme 
Court has also ruled that such “chats” as well as “unsolicited outbursts” before 
a suspect is admonished need not be suppressed.129  German police also used to 
engage in such pre-admonition “chats” until the Supreme Court articulated a 
categorical exclusionary rule in such cases.130 
Only the Italians appear to have erected a barrier against police using the 
pretext of “informational interviews,” “chats,” or interviewing the defendant 
“as a witness” to circumvent the necessity of advising a suspect of the right to 
counsel and the right to remain silent.  Section 350(7) of the Italian Code of 
Criminal Procedure makes even spontaneous statements to the police in the 
absence of counsel inadmissible in court.131 
D. Effect of an Invocation of the Right to Counsel or Silence 
The restrictions placed on the police by the U.S. Supreme Court when the 
defendant invokes either the right to remain silent or the right to counsel 
appear to be more substantial than in many Continental European jurisdictions.  
Although police in the United States must desist from questioning a suspect 
who indicates a desire to remain silent following Miranda warnings, the 
officers may return if a sufficient period of time has passed and, especially, if 
they wish to interrogate about another crime.132  On the other hand, in England 
and Wales, the police may still put questions to the suspect, who need not 
answer them.133 
 
 127. See RAIMUND BAUMANN & HARALD BRENNER, DIE STRAFPROZESSUALEN 
BEWEISVERWERTUNGSVERBOTE 79 (1991).  Spontaneous admissions following the asking of 
mere “informational questions” will not be excluded.  See CLAUS ROXIN, 
STRAFVERFAHRENSRECHT 179 (24th ed. 1995).  The German Supreme Court ruled some years 
ago that it was not “interrogation” to show the defendant’s prior statements made by him to the 
police and to the public prosecutor and to ask him if they were true.  BGHSt 7, 73, cited in 
KLEINKNECHT & MEYER-GOßNER, supra note 58, §15, at 467. 
 128. Field, supra note 105, at 232. 
 129. Id. 
 130. See Craig M. Bradley, The Exclusionary Rule in Germany, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1032, 
1052 (1983).  Studies in the 1980s found that German police officers rather routinely ignored the 
warnings requirement.  Id. at 1053 n.111. 
 131. See text accompanying supra note 76. 
 132. Michigan v. Mosely, 423 U.S. 96, 106 (1975). 
 133. See RCCJ REPT., supra note 60, § 21, at 13. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
602 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 45:581 
In the United States, under the rule of Edwards v. Arizona,134 an invocation 
by a suspect of the right to counsel will generally foreclose any further 
attempts at interrogation unless the suspect, herself, “initiates” further 
conversation.135  As to police attempts to interrogate a suspect after he has 
invoked the right to counsel in Germany, the German Supreme Court has said: 
If the police officer wants in such a case to continue the interrogation it is only 
permissible without a preliminary consultation with defense counsel if the 
accused expressly declares himself in agreement with the continuation of the 
interrogation after being re-admonished.  There must, however, have been a 
previous earnest effort by the police officer to help the accused in an effective 
manner to realize the contact with a defense lawyer.  All this is required, 
because the accused is often, especially in the case of an arrest, confused by 
the events and pressured and anxious by the unfamiliar surroundings. 
. . . 
There was a lack of the required efforts here.  Of course the police will, as a 
rule, avoid recommending a particular defense lawyer in order to avoid the 
impression of a close working relationship with particular defense lawyers.  It 
is impermissible to pretend readiness to help in setting up the contact with 
mere “pretend-activity” and to exploit the expected futility at the outset as well 
as the related discouragement of the accused in order to continue the attempt at 
interrogation.  The mere handing over of the local Hamburg telephone book in 
which, under the caption “law offices,” a very great number of entries could be 
found, was no help, and, especially in light of the circumstances was better 
suited to convince the accused G., who did not understand the German 
language, of the impossibility of an impending contact with a lawyer.  The 
police officers refrained from advising him of the telephone number of the 
emergency lawyer service, which could have been of real help.136 
E. Excludability of Statements Made Without Proper Warning 
1. The Theory of “Nullities” 
Post-inquisitorial European systems confronted procedural errors, even if 
they would today impact constitutional rights, as procedural “nullities,” that is, 
void of any legal force.  In France “a nullity occurs when there is a failure to 
recognize a substantial formality required in a provision of the present code or 
any other provision of criminal procedure has infringed on the interests of the 
 
 134. 451 U.S. 477, 484 (1981).  See also supra note 48. 
 135. Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1045-46 (1983). 
 136. BGHSt, 42, 15 (19-20).  See also BGHSt 38, 372 (373), a case in which police denied 
the accused the opportunity to contact defense counsel, despite the fact that he already knew who 
the defense counsel was. The right of police to attempt to re-question the accused is universally 
accepted once he has had a chance to talk to a lawyer.  See BGHSt 42, 170 (173-74). 
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party to which it applies.”137  Such a violation must, however, “affect the 
interests of the party concerned,”138 and not be a “mere” formality.  The result 
of the finding of a “nullity” would be removal of the documentation of the 
tainted evidence from the investigative dossier which was historically the 
receptacle for all evidence admissible at trial.139  The French Code of Penal 
Procedure does not explicitly provide that violations of the protections related 
to garde à vue result in a “nullity” and it is extremely difficult for French 
defendants to show that violations in the giving of admonitions prior to 
questioning in garde à vue should lead to exclusion of the statements.140 
For instance, the French Supreme Court, Cour de cassation, held that a 
failure of the police to have the accused sign the document attesting to his 
having been advised of his rights prior to questioning in garde à vue did not 
affect the accused’s rights.141  Because the accused had indeed been informed 
of his rights, the statement would not be excluded.142  On the other hand, the 
same court recently held that a failure to advise the suspect of his rights before 
garde à vue because of the lack of an interpreter, affected his rights and led to 
the suppression of the confession he had made.143 
The Italian Code of Penal Procedure differentiates between “absolute 
nullities,” something akin to what U.S. courts would call “plain error,” and 
“relative nullities.”  “Absolute nullities” include jurisdictional errors, 
violations of the prosecutor’s monopoly on the charging power, or violations 
of the mandatory right to counsel.  “Relative nullities” deal with other 
procedural rules during the preliminary investigation or the preliminary 
hearing.144  “Absolute nullities” may not be “sanitized” through a proper 
correction of the erroneous procedures as may some of the other procedural 
violations.145 
 
 137. C. PR. PÉN.-FRANCE § 171; see also C.P.P.-Italy § 177 (containing similar language). 
 138. C. PR. PÉN.-FRANCE § 802. 
 139. C. PR. PÉN.-FRANCE § 174 para. 3.  In the Netherlands, even a coerced statement is not 
removed from the investigative file by the investigating magistrate.  The decision as to whether it 
may be used at trial rests with the trial judge.  See Field, supra note 105, at 242. 
 140. PRADEL, supra note 53, at 398. 
 141. The decision was made pursuant to Sections 63-1, 64 & 66 of the old version of the 
French Code of Criminal Procedure, before the 2000 revisions which introduced a form of 
Miranda-warnings.  See text accompanying supra note 90. 
 142. Crim. Dec. 6, 1995, No. 369, at 1082, 1083. 
 143. Crim. Dec. 3, 1996, No. 443, at 1297, 1298. 
 144. C.P.P.-ITALY §§ 178-181. 
 145. C.P.P.-ITALY §§ 179, 183, 184.  See Elizabeth M.T. Di Palma, Riflessioni sulla sfera di 
operatività della sanzione di cui all’art. 191 c.p.p., in PERCORSI DI PROCEDURA PENALE, DAL 
GARANTISMO INQUISITORIO A UN ACCUSATORIO NON GARANTITO 113, 116-17 (Vincenzo 
Perchinunno ed., 1996). 
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2. Non-Usability of Evidence 
The modern trend in the post-inquisitorial European systems is to depart 
from the old concept of “nullities,” however, in favor of statutory or even 
constitutionally based exclusionary rules, preventing the use of evidence 
gathered in violation of the law as a foundation for a judgment or 
conviction.146  The Italian Code of Criminal Procedure has introduced what 
appears to be an ironclad exclusionary rule, phrased in terms of “non-
usability,” inutilizzabilità: “Evidence acquired in violation of prohibitions 
established by law may not be used.”147  Similarly, in Spain, “evidence 
obtained, directly or indirectly, in violation of fundamental rights or liberties 
shall be given no effect.”148 
It will be recalled that Italy applies a more specific rule of non-usability to 
all statements, whether spontaneous or elicited, which are gathered by the 
police from a suspect or accused in the absence of defense counsel.149  Despite 
the seemingly rigid exclusionary rule relating to statements of suspects and the 
accused, there seems to be authority in Italy that the failure to advise the 
person subject to police interrogation of the right to remain silent will not lead 
to the statement being excluded and a conviction based thereon being 
overturned.150  Thus, it appears that the high courts of Italy treat lack of 
counsel during interrogations as a fundamental violation leading to “non-
usability.”  However, the courts treat failure to advise of the right to remain 
silent as a mere “nullity,” or error in the statutorily prescribed form of 
gathering evidence, which will not necessarily lead to exclusion.151 
 
 146. For instance, § 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms provides: 
“[W]here . . . a court finds that evidence was obtained in a manner that infringed or denied any of 
the rights or freedoms guaranteed by this Charter, the evidence shall be excluded if it is 
established that, having regard to all the circumstances, the admission of it in the proceedings 
would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.” See BRADLEY, supra note 106, at 113.  
Note that this sounds like the U.S. Supreme Court’s earlier rooting of the Fourth Amendment 
exclusionary rule in preserving “judicial integrity.”  See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 
222 (1960).  The U.S. Supreme Court has rejected this rationale in favor of that based in the 
deterrent effect on police of a suppression of evidence seized in violation of the Constitution.  See 
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 919 (1984). 
 147. C.P.P.-ITALY § 191(1). “Non-usability” is the sanction resulting from a substantive 
violation which affects the gathering of a piece of evidence, whereas “nullity” is the sanction 
when there is an error in the statutorily prescribed form of acquiring evidence.  See SERGIO 
RAMAJOLI, LA PROVA NEL PROCESSO PENALE 20-24 (1995) [hereinafter RAMAJOLI]. 
 148. LEY ORGANICA DEL PODER JUDICIAL [L.O.P.J.] § 11.1 [hereinafter L.O.P.J.-SPAIN], 
translated by author from MUERZA ESPARZA, supra note 56, at 304. 
 149. C.P.P.-ITALY §§ 63, 350(6)-(7); see text accompanying supra note 76. 
 150. See Marilena Colamussi, Interrogatorio dell’imputato ed omesso avvertimento della 
facoltà di non respondere, in PERCORSI DI PROCEDURA PENALE, DAL GARANTISMO 
INQUISITORIO A UN ACCUSATORIO NON GARANTITO 15 (Vincenzo Perchinunno ed., 1996) (citing 
a decision of the Italian Supreme Court rendered November 12, 1991). 
 151. Id. at 16 (criticizing this jurisprudence). 
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To trigger Spain’s statutory exclusionary rule, there must be a violation of 
a “fundamental right or liberty,” and not violations of mere technical statutory 
formalities in the taking of evidence.152  The jurisprudence of the Spanish high 
courts has repeatedly made it clear that a failure to advise a suspect-accused of 
the right to remain silent or the right to counsel constitute violations of the 
constitutional rights incorporated in Articles 17(3) and 24(1) of the Spanish 
Constitution and that this, of necessity, requires suppression of the evidence 
under Section 11.1 of the Law of the Judicial Power.153  In the words of the 
Spanish Supreme Court: 
The caselaw is repeated and settled in the sense that, given the Constitution 
and the presumption of innocence established in Article 24 as a fundamental 
right, the declaration of an accused before the police without the guarantees 
established in Article 17 of the Constitution, among which is fundamentally 
the presence of a lawyer, cannot be considered to constitute a sufficient basis 
for rebutting such presumption.154 
The Spanish Constitutional Court has also ruled that admission of evidence 
seized in violation of fundamental rights and liberties violates the equality of 
the parties in the adversarial trial: 
[G]iven the inadmissibility of evidence obtained in violation of fundamental 
rights, its procedural reception implies an ignorance of the proper ‘guarantees’ 
of the trial [Constitución art. 24.2], implying also an unacceptable institutional 
confirmation of the lack of equality between the parties at the trial 
[Constitución art. 14], a lack of equality which has been procured illegally 
benefiting he who has gathered evidentiary instruments in violation of the 
fundamental rights of the other.155 
Russia also has an exclusionary rule rooted in its Constitution.156  The 
constitutional provision was statutorily implemented in the bill that 
reestablished trial by jury in 1993.157  It has been applied to exclude statements 
 
 152. The Spanish distinguish, similarly, between “illicit evidence” (prueba ilícita) gathered in 
violation of a simple law and “prohibited evidence” (prueba prohibida) gathered in violation of 
constitutional rights.  VICENTE GIMENO SENDRA ET AL., supra note 67, at 384.  Note the 
similarity here with U.S. jurisprudence, which normally provides for exclusion only when 
“constitutional” and not mere statutory rights are violated.  See SALTZBURG & CAPRA, supra note 
23, at 456-59. 
 153. S.T.S., Feb. 7, 1992 (R.J., No. 1108, 1409-10). 
 154. S.T.S., Feb. 11, 1998 (R.J., No. 175, 1865, 1867). 
 155. See B.J.C., March 26, 1996, (B.J.C., No. 49, 133, 137-38, 180). 
 156. Article 50(2) of the Russian Constitution provides: “In the administration of justice the 
use of evidence obtained in violation of federal law shall not be permitted.” 
 157. Section 69, paragraph 3 of the Russian Code of Criminal Procedure provides: “Evidence 
obtained in violation of the law is recognized as not possessing legal force and may not be made a 
basis for an accusation nor be used to prove circumstances listed in article 68 of this code” 
[relating to proving the elements of the crime].  See also Stephen C. Thaman, Das neue russische 
Geschworenengericht, 108 ZSTW 191, 196 n.31, 199 (1996). 
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of suspects and the accused in the absence of the admonitions required 
pursuant to Article 51 of the Russian Constitution.  Evidence has been 
suppressed by Russian judges in anywhere from one-third to seventy percent of 
all cases tried before Russian juries since 1993,158 including cases of violations 
of Russia’s Miranda-type warnings.159  Nevertheless, the Russian Supreme 
Court has reversed acquittals of defendants in cases where their inculpatory 
statements had been suppressed on the grounds that the trial judge had 
purportedly violated the rights of the prosecution by unlawfully excluding the 
evidence.160 
The Russian Supreme Court has also reversed acquittals of defendants in 
cases where confessions were suppressed because they had been taken in 
violation of the requirement of admonitions, or following police coercion.  
These reversals were based on the fact that the defendant or defense counsel 
had told the jury that illegal police tactics had been used.  The Supreme Court 
held that this constituted bringing irrelevant material, unrelated to proving the 
elements of the crime, before the jury.161 
3. The Proportionality Test of Exclusion 
The Spanish Supreme Court has ruled that when a violation does not affect 
fundamental rights, then the principle of material truth162 prevails and the 
evidence will be admitted.163  The German Supreme Court has engaged in 
balancing when considering Miranda-type warnings: 
The Chamber shares the interpretation of the submitting appellate court that 
the violation by a police officer of the duty to admonish pursuant to Sections 
136(1)(2) and 163a(4)(2) of the German Code of Criminal Procedure provides 
the basis for a prohibition in the use of the evidence upon which the appeal 
filed on behalf of the defendant can fundamentally rely. . . .  The Senate 
deviates thereby from its earlier jurisprudence . . . . 
The German Criminal Procedure Statute gives no conclusive rule about 
prohibitions on the use of evidence . . . . The question as to whether a 
 
 158. See Thaman, Europe’s New Jury Systems, supra note 13, at 242 n.47. 
 159. See Thaman, Resurrection, supra note 103, at 91. 
 160. Id. 
 161. See Thaman, Europe’s New Jury Systems, supra note 13, at 284 n.82. 
 162. The traditional goal of inquisitorial criminal procedure was to ascertain the truth and this 
principle remains at the heart of Continental European criminal procedure.  See Albin Eser, 
Funktionswandel von Prozeßmaximen, 104 ZStW 361, 362 (1992).  See also C. PR. PÉN.-FRANCE 
§ 81(1). 
 163. With regard to the application of the U.S. constitutional right to be free from 
unreasonable searches and seizures, however, the U.S. Supreme Court has held: “Unbending 
application of the exclusionary sanction to enforce ideals of governmental rectitude would 
impede unacceptably the truth-finding functions of judge and jury.”  United States v. Leon, 468 
U.S. 897, 907 (1984). 
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prohibition on the gathering of evidence brings with it a prohibition on the use 
of the evidence must be specially decided as to each provision and for each 
case on its facts. . . . The decision as to whether or not there will be a 
prohibition on use is made on the bases of a comprehensive balancing test . . . .  
The weight of the procedural violation as well as its importance for the legally 
protected sphere of the interested party must be considered and placed in the 
balance as well as the consideration, that the truth may not be sought at any 
price . . . .  On the other hand, one must consider that prohibitions on use 
impinge on the possibilities of determining the truth . . . and that the State 
according to the case law of the Constitutional Court must guarantee an 
administration of justice which is capable of functioning, without which justice 
cannot be realized . . . .  If the procedural provision, which has been violated, 
does not, or not primarily, serve to protect the accused, then a prohibition on 
use will be unlikely . . . .  On the other hand, a prohibition on use is appropriate 
when the violated procedural provision is designed to secure the foundations of 
the procedural position of the accused or defendant in a criminal prosecution. 
The principle, that no one must testify against himself in a criminal 
proceeding, that is, has a right to silence, belongs to the recognized principles 
of criminal procedure . . . .  It has found a positive expression in Article 14(3g) 
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of the United 
Nations.  The recognition of this right to silence reflects the care given to 
human dignity . . . .  It protects the personality rights of the accused and is a 
necessary component of a fair trial . . . . 
At the time of the first interrogation by the police the accused is, compared 
with the circumstances at the trial, not to a lesser extent, but rather to a greater 
extent in danger of unthinkingly incriminating himself . . . .  While the 
defendant can calmly prepare himself for his testimonial decisions in the trial 
and seek legal counsel, and moreover often has a defense counsel at his side, 
the first police interrogation usually finds the accused unprepared, without 
anyone to counsel him, and also cut off from familiar surroundings, also not 
seldom confused by the events and pressured or afraid due to the 
unaccustomed surroundings.  The defendant can, also with the help of his 
defense counsel, smooth out statements given at the trial, while the first 
statements to the police are often deprived of such a possibility of influence 
and despite a change in testimonial behavior develop a factual impact which 
has significant importance for the further course of the trial. 
Whoever, at the beginning of the interrogation knew, even without 
admonitions, that he did not have to give a statement, is, however, not worthy 
of protection to the same extent as the person who was unaware of his right to 
silence.  To be sure he must be admonished pursuant to Sections 136(1)(2) and 
163a(4)(2) of the German Criminal Procedure Statute.  However the 
prohibition on use will exceptionally not apply here. The balancing of the 
values leads to the result, that the interest on proceeding with the trial in such a 
case should be accorded priority.  If the trial judge, preferably through free 
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evaluation of the evidence, comes to the conclusion that the accused knew his 
right to silence at the beginning of the interrogation, then he may use the 
content of the statements which the accused made to the police without the 
admonitions, in formulating the judgment.  Otherwise he must heed the 
prohibition on use.164 
Determining that a violation is substantial and impacts constitutional rights 
will always lead to exclusion in Spain, whereas it is only the first step in the 
German analysis.  In Germany, while the failure to admonish is a violation of a 
substantial right of the suspect, it will not lead to exclusion and is deemed 
harmless, if there is evidence that the defendant already knew of his 
constitutional right to remain silent and to speak with counsel.165  German 
courts will also balance the seriousness of the offense into the equation and 
will allow use of evidence seized in violation of basic rights if the seriousness 
of the offense investigated significantly outweighs the seriousness of the 
violation.166 
4. Case-by-Case Fairness Test: The English Approach 
There is no blanket statutory exclusionary rule in England and Wales.  As 
in Germany, the decision whether or not to exclude is approached on a case-
by-case basis pursuant to Section 78(1) of the PACE, which provides: 
In any proceedings the court may refuse to allow evidence on which the 
prosecution proposed to rely to be given if it appears to the court that, having 
regard to all the circumstances, including the circumstances in which the 
evidence was obtained, the admission of the evidence would have such an 
 
 164. BGHSt 38, 214 (219-22, 224-25, 227-30). 
 165. Miranda warnings must, on the other hand, be given to all in-custody suspects before 
being interrogated: “The Fifth Amendment privilege is so fundamental to our system of 
constitutional rule and the expedient of giving an adequate warning as to the availability of the 
privilege so simple, we will not pause to inquire in individual cases whether the defendant was 
aware of his rights without a warning being given.” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 468. 
 166. The German Supreme Court has recognized that the seizure and reading of private 
diaries violates the right to human dignity guaranteed by Article 1 of the German Constitution 
and the right to a “free development of the personality” guaranteed by Article 22.  It has 
suppressed inculpatory evidence gleaned from such a seizure in a prosecution for perjury.  BGHSt 
19, 325 (330-33).  On the other hand, the Court refused to suppress diary entries in a brutal 
murder case.  BGHSt 34, 397 (401). 
  The U.S. Supreme Court also makes some distinctions based on the seriousness of the 
offense.  For instance, a warrantless entry of a dwelling on probable cause that evidence will be 
destroyed is impermissible if the offense is a minor one.  See Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 
750 (1984).  Similarly, an arrest in public for a misdemeanor not committed in the presence of the 
arresting officer will normally not be permitted without an arrest warrant, whereas a felony arrest 
without a warrant under such circumstances is permissible.  See United States v. Watson, 423 
U.S. 411, 418 (1976). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2001] MIRANDA IN COMPARATIVE LAW 609 
adverse effect on the fairness of the proceedings that the court ought not to 
admit it . . . .167 
In cases where statements from suspects have been taken in the absence of the 
required warnings or in violation of the right to counsel, and where no other 
“oppression” is present,168 the trial court must decide whether the use of the 
statements will result in an “unfair” trial.  In a case where the accused was 
interviewed four times without access to counsel in violation of Section 58 of 
the PACE, the trial court admitted the statements, and the defendant was 
convicted.169  The English Court of Appeal ruled that: “In this case this 
appellant was denied improperly one of the most important and fundamental 
rights of a citizen” and reversed the conviction.  It held that the court had not 
properly balanced the seriousness of the violation against any possible reasons 
for the violation.170  In effecting this case-by-case balancing, English courts, 
like their German counterparts, take into consideration whether the failure to 
admonish was in bad faith and whether the suspect already knew of the right to 
remain silent.171 
English courts will also suppress statements per Section 78 of the PACE 
when the suspect is deluded about the precise nature of the charges confronting 
him at the time he is interrogated.  In one case a man was led to believe that he 
was only being interrogated about a purse-snatch robbery and was not told that 
the victim, an old woman, had fallen, hurt herself badly, and died in the 
hospital.  The Court of Appeal ruled that this constituted a violation of such 
seriousness that exclusion was the proper remedy.172  While the statutes 
regulating the Miranda-like admonitions in Germany, Spain, France and Italy 
all require that the suspect be advised of the nature of the crime attributed to 
her, Germany, for instance, allows the police to withhold the exact nature of 
the offense if its revelation will hinder the police in resolving the case.173 
 
 167. PACE-ENGLAND § 78 displaces the old case law in England, which did not provide for 
suppression of illegally gathered evidence other than in cases of involuntary confessions.  See 
SEABROOKE & SPRACK, supra note 58, at 139. 
 168. Involuntary statements that are the result of “oppression” are excludable pursuant to 
PACE-ENGLAND § 76. 
 169. R. v. Samuel, 2 All E.R. 135, 147 (C.A. 1988). 
 170. Id. at 147. 
 171. See R. v. Alladice, 87 Crim. App. R. 380 (1988), cited in SEABROOKE & SPRACK, supra 
note 58, at 130-31. 
 172. R. v. Kirk, 1 W.L.R. 567 (C.A. 2000). 
 173. See KLEINKNECHT & MEYER-GOßNER, supra note 58, at 467 § 13.  Presumably this 
would exclude as a means of resolving the case an inducement of a confession through deception.  
But the German Supreme Court upheld a conviction in a case where the police told the defendant, 
who at the time was being interrogated as a witness, that the supposedly “missing person” they 
were investigating had already been found dead.  Once they revealed the death, the defendant was 
then properly admonished before giving an incriminating statement.  BGHSt 8, 337 (338-39). 
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5. Other Countries 
Canada seems to have implemented a fairly rigid exclusionary rule when 
police do not respect a suspect’s request to see counsel before being 
interrogated.  Where a suspect was nevertheless interrogated after having 
stated, “I ain’t saying anything until I see my lawyer,” the Canadian Supreme 
Court suppressed the statement and reversed a conviction based thereon, 
holding that Section 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
imposed a duty on police “to cease questioning or otherwise attempting to 
elicit evidence from the detainee until he has had a reasonable opportunity to 
retain and instruct counsel.”174 
F. Fruits of the Poisonous Tree 
The fact that a statement obtained from a suspect in the absence of 
Miranda-like warnings cannot be used against him or her at trial does not 
necessarily reach the question of whether the information obtained in such 
statement may be used to follow investigative leads.  These leads provide, for 
instance, a basis upon which to obtain a search warrant or wiretap,175 or to 
impeach the defendant if he testifies contrary thereto at trial.176  If the 
statement without warnings is followed by proper admonitions, and then a 
statement affirming the facts that were revealed in the illegal statement is 
made, the second statement will also be admissible.177 
The Spanish courts have repeatedly invoked the doctrine of “fruit of the 
poisonous tree.”178  In a 1992 decision of the Spanish Supreme Court, the 
defendants appealed convictions for being members of an armed terrorist 
 
 174. Queen v. Manninen, 58 C.R.3d 97, 104 (1987), cited in BRADLEY, supra note 106, at 
116. 
 175. Evidence found by exploiting leads obtained in a Miranda-defective statement has been 
ruled by the U.S. Supreme Court to be beyond the scope of Miranda’s exclusionary rule.  See 
Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 450 (1974) (witness discovered).  See also New York v. 
Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 660 (1984) (O’Connor J., concurring); United States v. Gonzalez-
Sandoval, 894 F.2d 1043, 1048 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. Elie, 111 F.3d 1135, 1142 (4th 
Cir. 1997). 
 176. See New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14, 21 (1990). 
 177. See Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 306-07 (1985).  Justice O’Connor, in Elstad, 
explained why the “fruits” of a Miranda-defective statement would still be admissible: “The 
Miranda exclusionary rule . . . sweeps more broadly than the Fifth Amendment itself.  It may be 
triggered even in the absence of a Fifth Amendment violation.  The Fifth Amendment prohibits 
use by the prosecution in its case in chief only of compelled testimony.”  Id. at 306-07.  Since the 
Court has distanced itself from this language in United States v. Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. 2326 
(2000), in holding that Miranda warnings are constitutionally compelled, one must wonder if this 
case law is still fully applicable.  This was discussed by Professors Israel, Dripps and Nowak at 
the Childress Lecture at the Saint Louis University School of Law on September 28, 2000. 
 178. The term was first coined by Justice Frankfurter in Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 
338, 341 (1939). 
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group and possessing military weapons and explosives on the basis that the 
weapons had been found in a garage based on leads gathered in the defendants’ 
statements which were taken in the absence of counsel. 
The illegitimate or illegal acquisition of evidence can function in conformity 
with Section 11.1 of the Spanish Law of the Judicial Power by directly or 
indirectly violating or undermining a fundamental right.  The condition 
reflected or indirectly established in the indicated provision cannot but intend 
to refer to cases in which the illegality of the acquired evidence is based on 
other activity which in a direct manner has violated a fundamental right. 
Thus, a doctrinal example is given of the case in which in an interrogation in 
which fundamental rights have been violated, one finds, after an act of entry 
and search effectuated with a judicial warrant, arms and fruits from a robbery 
or narcotic substances.  The theme in such cases is that of determining if the 
irregularity irradiates its effects to the totality of the evidence by virtue of the 
so-called ‘doctrine of the fruits of the poisonous tree’ found in Anglo-Saxon 
law [‘fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine’] or if, on the contrary, there does not 
exist a relation of interdependency between the irregular and the regular and 
thus the latter can be deemed to be useful to undermine the presumption of 
innocence. 
The doctrinal solution is reasonable which in such cases distinguishes between 
the cases in which one simply gains knowledge of a fact and those in which by 
the verification of such a fact [discovery of the objects] one tries to derive an 
evidentiary consequence against the accused.  [For example, that he/she had 
placed the objects and had dominion and control over them].  In this second 
case, the evidence would be illegal, whereas in the first, since the content of 
the confession had no evidentiary significance, not even in a circumstantial 
sense, it could not be deemed to be illegally obtained evidence.179 
In Germany, the literature is not clear as to whether a violation of the 
admonitions required by Sections 136 and 243(4)(1) of the Code of Criminal 
Procedure will also lead to a prohibition against following leads gathered from 
the inadmissible statements.180  Germans do, however, recognize a variation on 
the “independent source”181 and “inevitable discovery”182 doctrines which 
 
 179. See STS, Feb. 7, 1992 (R.J., No. 1108, p. 1409, 1410).  There appears, however, to be 
some case law allowing use of “fruits” of a defective confession, as long the “indirect” fruits of 
the bad confession do not constitute the only basis for the finding of guilt.  See VICENTE GIMENO 
SENDRA ET AL., supra note 67, at 507. 
 180. See KLEINKNECHT & MEYER-GOßNER, supra note 58, § 20, at 469. 
 181. In U.S. jurisprudence, evidence first discovered unlawfully may nevertheless be 
admissible, if there is a legal independent source for its ultimate discovery and seizure.  See 
Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 537 (1988).  Justice Holmes first used the term 
“independent source” in Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920). 
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require that the police have “clean hands.”183  It must thereby be shown that 
there was a “clean path” to the evidence independent of the illegality or, the 
counterpart to “inevitable discovery,” a “hypothetical clean path.”184 
European Courts have on occasion suppressed statements following proper 
Miranda-like warnings if they followed on the heels of incriminating 
statements that had been given either without proper warnings or in violation 
of the right to counsel.  In a 1991 case in England, a woman was arrested on 
homicide charges and was interviewed on two occasions.  A solicitor was 
present for only one of these meetings. The Court of Appeal expostulated: 
On appeal it was held that the first confession was made in consequence of M 
being denied access to a solicitor and was for that reason likely to be 
unreliable.  Had a solicitor been present the interview would have been halted 
when M became emotionally upset.  The interview was held quickly and 
without the formalities of the Code because the police were anxious to 
discover the missing woman, but this heightened the risk of the confession 
being unreliable. 
The second interview took place the following day in compliance with the 
provisions of the Code and in the presence of a solicitor.  However that 
confession was a direct consequence of the first.  Moreover the appellant’s 
solicitor was not informed that the appellant had been wrongly denied access 
when M was brought to the police station. If the solicitor had known that, she 
would have realized immediately that the first confession was suspect and in 
all probability would not have allowed the second interview to take place. 
Held, that the earlier breaches of the Act and the Code rendered the contents of 
the second interview inadmissible also.  The court added that one cannot 
refrain from emphasizing that when an accused person has made a series of 
admissions as to his or her complicity in a crime at a first interview, the very 
fact that those admissions have been made are likely to have an effect upon the 
person during the course of a second interview.  Accordingly, if it be held, as it 
is held here, that the first interview was in breach of the rules and in breach of 
 
 182. In U.S. jurisprudence, evidence unlawfully seized may nevertheless be admissible if it 
would inevitably have been discovered by legal means.  See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 
(1984). 
 183. The German exclusionary rules are not exclusively based on police deterrence as they 
are in the United States.  United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 919 (1984).  Rather, the focus in 
Germany is on what the U.S. Supreme Court used to call “judicial integrity.”  See discussion of 
“judicial integrity” supra note 146; see Thomas Weigend, Germany, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: A 
WORLDWIDE STUDY 197 (Craig M. Bradley ed., 1999) [hereinafter Weigend, Germany]. 
 184. Canada also employs the doctrine of “inevitable discovery.”  In R. v. Black, 70 C.R.3d 
97, 117 (1989), the defendant requested a particular lawyer and the police attempted 
unsuccessfully to contact that lawyer.  Police questioned the defendant nevertheless, and she 
confessed.  Her confession led police to the murder weapon.  The Canadian Supreme Court 
suppressed the confession but held that the knife would “undoubtedly have been uncovered by the 
police in the absence of the Charter breach.”  See BRADLEY, supra note 106, at 116. 
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Section 58, it seems to the court that the subsequent interview must be 
similarly tainted. 
Both confessions should have been excluded under Section 76, PACE the 
result of that evidence being excluded is that there was no reliable evidence 
against M and accordingly the appeal was allowed and the conviction 
quashed.185 
The sense of urgency that led the police to interview without proper 
admonitions in the case discussed above might have excused the giving of 
Miranda-like admonitions in the United States under the “public safety 
exception” articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court.186  Here, the English Court 
of Appeal noted that such admissions might be less reliable than those given in 
non-emergency situations.  German courts have also found that subsequent 
admissions with proper admonitions were not independent from an earlier 
illegal statement given after police had hampered the suspect’s attempts to 
contact counsel.187  It must be emphasized, however, that the aforementioned 
English and German decisions are not necessarily different than would be 
required by U.S. law, inasmuch as a refusal to respect a request for counsel 
prior to charging188 or after charging189 would also render subsequent 
statements inadmissible. 
Although statements taken in the absence of counsel may not be used 
against the defendant in his own trial in Italy, they may be used to impeach the 
defendant and for other non-trial purposes, but only if the defendant had been 
advised of the right to counsel.190  There is also authority that such statements 
may be used against the defendant in hearings related to the imposition of 
preventive detention or other protective measures, or in making a decision 
about whether to initiate procedures for an expedited trial.191  Such statements 
may also be used against third-party defendants.192 
G. Evidentiary Use of the Exercise of the Right to Remain Silent 
Finally, there is the issue regarding what happens when a suspect-accused 
in Europe actually decides not to give a statement after being admonished of 
 
 185. R. v. McGovern, Crim. L.R. 124, 125 (1991). 
 186. See New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984). 
 187. “However this interrogation was directly related to the previous questioning; it had as its 
goal, among other things, to preserve the confession in an evidentiarily admissible form.”  See 
BGHSt 38, 372 (375). 
 188. See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981). 
 189. See Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 
(1977). 
 190. See Rachel VanCleave, Italy, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: A WORLDWIDE STUDY 264 
(Craig M. Bradley ed., 1999). 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id.; see also RAMAJOLI, supra note 147, at 42. 
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the right to remain silent.  In the United States, no comment may be made at 
trial on the defendant’s refusal to testify on his own behalf, and the jury is 
admonished that this fact may not be used by them as evidence of guilt.193  
Regarding the defendant’s pre-trial silence, the U.S. Supreme Court has held 
that the prosecution may comment on a suspect’s pre-arrest silence or silence 
when confronted with incriminating evidence,194 and on the silence of a 
suspect post-arrest, but before being given her Miranda warnings.195  The 
Supreme Court has, however, held that it would violate due process to allow 
comment or use of a suspect’s or accused’s silence after she had been 
admonished pursuant to Miranda of the right to remain silent.196 
While the fact of a suspect-accused’s silence during the investigation may 
traditionally give rise to an adverse inference in French criminal 
proceedings,197 no evidentiary use may be made of such silence following 
admonitions in Germany.  In a 1965 case the German Supreme Court 
confronted a man who remained silent when the police attempted to interrogate 
him regarding thefts from telephone booths, but later spoke to the investigating 
magistrate.  The court opined: 
Whether the right of the accused, to refuse to make a statement about the case, 
also completely prohibits drawing disadvantageous conclusions from his 
silence, may be doubtful.  This is especially the case when the accused remains 
silent only partially, or during only one or a few of multiple judicial 
interrogations.  In the instant case the Chamber need not answer this question. 
Such conclusions are legally inadmissible in any case when the accused, as 
was here the case availed himself of this right to the full extent at arrest and in 
the following police interrogation, because he, regardless of for what reason, 
deemed it to be correct to first make statements about the case during a judicial 
interrogation. 
A contrary view would limit the right of the accused, not to make a statement 
about the case, in a legally impermissible manner.  For it signifies that the 
accused, who is aware thereof, would feel himself compelled to give a 
statement immediately at his first police interrogation, rather than run the risk 
that disadvantageous inferences could be drawn in a later judicial proceeding 
from his conduct during that interrogation.  An interpretation which would lead 
to such results contradicts Section 136a of the German Criminal Procedure 
 
 193. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 613 (1965); Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288, 298 
(1981). 
 194. See Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 238-39 (1980). 
 195. See Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603, 609 (1982). 
 196. See Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 619-20 (1976). 
 197. Vogler, supra note 64, at 32, notes that “the nature of the trial process ensures that it is 
almost impossible, in practice, to remain silent,” but that when a defendant does so, as in the trials 
of Marshall Pétain in 1945 and General Salan during the Algerian crisis of 1962, “it may give rise 
to an adverse inference.” 
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Statute, which fundamentally prohibits undermining the accused’s freedom of 
exercising his own will through coercion. 
Criminal procedure must also be just to accused individuals who are innocent.  
Even such individuals can, for reasons of the most varied sort, consider it 
proper to make a statement about the case before a judge rather than before a 
police officer.  The fear that a corresponding attitude could be considered to 
his disadvantage during the evaluation of the evidence would make such 
conduct in many cases well-nigh impossible and therefore limit the right to 
remain silent before the police in a manner which is unacceptable.  As to 
accused individuals who are guilty, the same applies.  He should be treated like 
an innocent person up until a judgment of guilt has become final.198 
In 1999, the German Supreme Court also held that no inference of guilt may be 
drawn, not only from the refusal of a defendant to testify, but also from his 
refusal to release his sister from a statutory privilege not to testify against a 
close relative.199 
At common law, an accused’s failure to give evidence could not be 
commented on by the prosecution and could have no independent evidentiary 
effect.200  This has changed in the United Kingdom, first with the enactment of 
the Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order of 1988,201 and then, in 
England and Wales, with the enactment of the Criminal Justice and Public 
Order Act in 1994 (CJPOA), which provides that: 
(1) Where, in any proceedings against a person for an offence, evidence is 
given that the accused— 
(a) at any time before he was charged with the offence, on being 
questioned under caution by a constable trying to discover whether or by 
whom the offence had been committed, failed to mention any fact relied 
on in his defence in those proceedings; or 
(b) on being charged with the offence or officially informed that he might 
be prosecuted for it, failed to mention any fact, being a fact which in the 
circumstances existing at the time the accused could reasonably have been 
expected to mention when so questioned, charged or informed, as the case 
may be, subsection (2) below applies. 
(2) Where this subsection applies— 
(c) the court in determining whether there is a case to answer; and 
 
 198. BGHSt 20, 281 (282-83). 
 199. See StPO-GERMANY § 52(3); BGH StV 5, 234. 
 200. See SEABROOKE & SPRACK, supra note 58, at 73-74, citing Criminal Evidence Act 1898 
§ 1(b) and R. v. Martinez-Tobon, 1 W.L.R. 388 (1994). 
 201. See discussion of the Order in Murray v. United Kingdom, 22 E.H.R.R. 29, 36 (1996).  
This law was enacted to deal with the “troubles” in Northern Ireland.  Id. 
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(d) the court or jury, in determining whether the accused is guilty of the 
offence charged, may draw such inferences from the failure as appear 
proper.202 
Other sections in the CJPOA effectively compel a suspect to respond to police 
questions when caught in flagrante203 or at the scene of a crime,204 and allow 
comment on, and use of, a suspect’s refusal to respond to police questions in 
those situations. 
Defendants in Northern Ireland, and in England and Wales have 
challenged these laws before the European Court of Human Rights.  In Murray 
v. United Kingdom,205 the defendant was arrested at the scene of an alleged 
hostage-taking.  Following the advice of his solicitor, he refused to make any 
statements at the scene to police officers after having been admonished that his 
silence could be used against him at trial.  The defendant was convicted in a 
trial before a professional judge who used his silence against him.206  The 
defendant claimed that the Northern Ireland statute, which was the model for 
the CJPOA, violated his right to remain silent and the presumption of 
innocence as protected by the English common law.207  The Court discussed 
the amicus brief of Amnesty International, which made the following 
arguments: 
Article 14 (3) (g) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
explicitly provides that an accused shall “not be compelled to testify against 
himself or to confess guilt.”  Reference was also made to Rule 42(A) of the 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia which expressly provides that a suspect has the right to 
remain silent and to the Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court, 
submitted to the United Nations General Assembly by the International Law 
Commission, which in Draft Article 26 (6)(a)(i) qualifies the right to silence 
with the words “without such silence being a consideration in the 
determination of guilt or innocence.”208 
 
 202. See Criminal Justice and Public Order Act [CJPOA] § 34 (1)(2) [hereinafter CJPOA-
ENGLAND], cited in SEABROOKE & SPRACK, supra note 58. 
 203. This is so where, for instance, the suspect is in possession of evidence that the police link 
to the scene of the crime.  See CJPOA-ENGLAND § 36. 
 204. CJPOA-ENGLAND § 37. 
 205. Murray v. United Kingdom, 22 E.H.R.R. 29, 36 (1996). 
 206. Id. at 34.  Jury trial was suspended in Northern Ireland for cases involving alleged 
terrorism.  See Sean Doran et al., Rethinking Adversariness in Nonjury Criminal Trials, 23 AM. J. 
CRIM. L. 1 (1995). 
 207. The European Convention of Human Rights explicitly guarantees the presumption of 
innocence under Article 6(2), and the provisions of Article 6(1), which guarantee a right to a fair 
trial, have been interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights to include a right to remain 
silent.  Funke v. France, 1 C.M.L.R. 897, 909-10 (1993). 
 208. Murray v. United Kingdom, 22 E.H.R.R. §42, at 58-59. 
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The Court, while finding that the privilege against self-incrimination “lie at the 
heart of the notion of a fair procedure under Article 6,”209 refused to prevent 
use of silence in all cases: 
On the one hand, it is self-evident that it is incompatible with the immunities 
under consideration to base a conviction solely or mainly on the accused’s 
silence or on a refusal to answer questions or to give evidence himself. On the 
other hand, the Court deems it equally obvious that these immunities cannot 
and should not prevent that the accused’s silence, in situations which clearly 
call for an explanation from him, be taken into account in assessing the 
persuasiveness of the evidence adduced by the prosecution.210 
The European Court of Human Rights was later called upon to decide a case 
arising under Section 34 of the CJPOA, in which the defendants were arrested 
for narcotics violations and exercised their right to remain silent upon advice 
of their lawyers partially due to the fact that they were under the influence of 
drugs at the time.211  The case was tried by a jury, which was instructed under 
Section 36 of the CJPOA that it could use the defendants’ silence to prove 
guilt.  In this case, the Court held that the evidentiary use of the defendants’ 
silence violated Article 6 of the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, because the jury had not been 
instructed, per Murray, that silence could not be the only evidence showing 
guilt and that there must be a prima facie showing of guilt for the silence to be 
admissible.  The Court also held that the defendants’ testimony that counsel 
had advised them not to speak made the case distinguishable from Murray.212 
Some English courts, as well, have deemed it error for the judge to instruct 
the jury that they may draw an inference of guilt from the fact that the 
defendant did not mention certain things to the police which he later relied 
upon during his testimony at trial.213 
 
 209. Id. § 45, at 60. 
 210. Id. §47, at 60. 
 211. Condron v. United Kingdom, Crim. L.R. 679 (2000), available at 
http://www.dhcour.coe.fr/hudoc/ViewRoot.asp?Item=0&Action=Html&X=1111181321&Notice
=0&Noticemode=&RelatedMode=0. 
 212. Id. at §§57, 60, 61, 66 & 68. 
 213. For instance, in R. v. McGarry, 1 W.L.R. 1500 (C.A. 1999), the defendant refused to 
speak to the police and later gave a short written statement claiming he had assaulted the victim in 
self-defense.  At trial he provided more details of the alleged assault by the victim, and the judge 
instructed the jury that they could use his failure to tell the police of the details as circumstantial 
evidence of guilt.  The court held that in such a situation the court should have instructed the jury 
pursuant to the common law rule that they may not draw any inferences from the defendant’s 
silence.  Id. at 1505-06. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
This perusal of the laws and jurisprudence in major European democratic 
jurisdictions as it relates to what we call “Miranda-rights” (for instance, the 
requirement of admonishing a suspect or accused in a criminal case of her right 
to remain silent and to consult with counsel before being interrogated), has 
revealed that the U.S. Supreme Court was correct in United States v. 
Dickerson214 to reject a challenge to the constitutionality of the regime 
imposed by Miranda.  Not only have the Miranda warnings become a 
recognized procedure in police interrogations in this country, but, as this article 
has explained, they have been adopted or strengthened over the years in 
formerly inquisitorial countries like Germany, Italy, Spain and most recently 
France, and are now recognized as having constitutional status.215  The post-
inquisitorial regimes of the European Continent seem to be moving in the 
direction of according criminal suspects more protection in their confrontations 
with police and other law enforcement officials.  Ironically, it is in the United 
Kingdom, the main common law jurisdiction in Europe, that there has been a 
regression in this area with the enactment of Section 34 of the CJPOA in 1994.  
By allowing comment on a suspect’s exercise of his right to remain silent, this 
section puts more pressure on the individual to submit to interrogation than any 
of the other regimes that have been examined on the European Continent.216 
In Italy and Spain a suspect has a right to have counsel present when he is 
questioned by the police, the prosecutor or a judge.  This is a right not enjoyed 
in England, the United States, France or Germany.217  Finally, Italy has taken a 
big step in completely eliminating the admissibility of any statements taken by 
police officers from suspects and has attempted to transform the 
“interrogation” exclusively into a vehicle of self-defense for the suspect.218  
Miranda-like warnings must be administered in Italy, Germany and England 
whenever suspicion is focused on a suspect, whether or not that person is in 
custody, thus giving more protection than Miranda itself in that regard.219 
Thus, if America is to entertain ideas about reforming the law of 
interrogation, it has two directions in which to move.  It can either move 
backwards (historically) to a more inquisitorial form of procedure aimed at 
making the suspect a prime source for evidence to be used in his own 
prosecution.  Or, the United States can move away from the inquisitorial 
 
 214. 120 S. Ct. 2326 (2000). 
 215. See discussion supra Section III-B. 
 216. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.  An exception is still France, where comment 
on the defendant’s exercise of his right to remain silent may still be used as an inference of guilt.  
See supra note 197. 
 217. See discussion supra Section III-B. 
 218. See supra notes 76-80 and accompanying text. 
 219. See discussion supra Section III-C. 
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modes, as is happening on the European Continent, by strengthening the right 
to counsel during pretrial confrontations with the police and other law 
enforcement personnel and granting the individual autonomy in the decision of 
whether to speak in his own defense, or accept guilt and throw himself on the 
mercy of the court. 
What effect do the varying regimes in place have on whether a suspect 
decides to speak in his or her own defense or to admit guilt?  In England and 
Wales before the enactment of Section 34 of the CJPOA, most suspects spoke 
with the police.220  The same is likely true in the United States.221  It is also no 
secret that most Continental European defendants speak to their interrogators 
before trial and go on to testify at trial, regardless of what regime of 
admonitions is in place.222  Whether or not a defendant speaks, however, is 
arguably attributable more to procedural realities in a criminal justice system 
other than the nature of admonitions, and finally, to a defendant’s view on the 
relative benefits he or she may receive from admitting guilt or giving evidence 
in his or her own behalf.  For instance, Continental European trials are usually 
not bifurcated into guilt and penalty phases, as are most American trials.  
Therefore, if the court is to hear mitigating evidence it must be before the guilt 
question has been decided.  This induces most European defendants to speak 
both before and during trial.223 
In America, the “accused speaks,” as everyone knows, in upwards of 
ninety percent of all cases in the form of a guilty plea.224  But we should really 
examine whether our system of police-dominated, jailhouse interrogations, in 
the absence of counsel continues to be necessary in the administration of 
criminal justice in our country.  The fact that the police are allowed to question 
suspects without counsel being present in the United States, England and 
Wales, France and Germany means that police may, after getting a valid 
 
 220. In metropolitan police districts, fourteen to sixteen percent remained silent, whereas in 
provincial districts the percentage fell to between six and ten percent.  In metropolitan districts 
twenty-nine percent of those who pleaded not guilty remained silent, whereas seventeen percent 
of those who pleaded guilty did so.  See RCCJ REPT., supra note 60, at 53. 
 221. In the United States, there are voices in the literature that claim the imposition of 
Miranda warnings has hampered law enforcement ability to get confessions and just as many who 
claim it has had little effect.  See SALTZBURG & CAPRA, supra note 23, at 652-53. 
 222. See Mirjan Damaska, Evidentiary Barriers to Conviction and Two Models of Criminal 
Procedure, l2l U. PA. L. REV. 506, 527 (l973). 
 223. MIRJAN R. DAMASKA, THE FACES OF JUSTICE AND STATE AUTHORITY 128 n.56 (1986).  
Some German reformers have proposed bifurcating the guilt and sentencing stages of trials so as 
to better guarantee a defendant’s right to remain silent during the trial.  See Roxin, supra note 84, 
at 197-98.  One could say that the “accused speaks” form of trial still exists to a greater extent on 
the European Continent than it does today in America.  Cf. Langbein, The Privilege, supra note 2, 
and accompanying text. 
 224. See WAYNE R. LA FAVE, JEROLD H. ISRAEL & NANCY J. KING, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
957 (3d ed. 2000). 
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waiver of the rights to counsel and to remain silent, use many of the same 
psychological tactics (short of coercion, and excessive trickery, promises or 
threats) that were documented in the Miranda opinion itself.225  All too 
frequently one reads newspaper accounts in the United States of innocent 
people who confess to serious crimes, even sometimes capital murder, after 
succumbing to the pressures or trickery of interrogating police officers,226 after 
having waived their Miranda rights.  Such cases arise in other countries as 
well.227  Despite the new regime of Miranda-like warnings in Russia, Russian 
police and investigators are notorious for their use of torture to coerce 
confessions by pretrial detainees.228 
The Italian solution of eliminating police interrogation as a source of 
admissible incriminating evidence is worth considering.  The United States 
could also adopt the Italian legislative solution of permitting interrogation of 
suspects only on their motion and only when they think it will aid in their 
defense.229  This would mean sacrificing the interrogation of the suspect or 
accused as a means of investigating his or her guilt.  In inquisitorial terms, the 
ascertainment of the truth would have to rely more heavily on witness 
testimony and circumstantial evidence. 
Other options would include substituting interrogation by a judge, which 
would result in a return to a variant of the justice of the peace system of the 
common law, or introducing a variant of the “judge of the investigation” or 
“investigating magistrate” systems that exist on the European continent.230  A 
 
 225. See Miranda, 384 U.S. 447 (discussing methods from police manuals, etc.).  For good 
examples of borderline cases involving deception and trickery following waiver of Miranda 
rights in which convictions were upheld, see Miller v. Fenton, 796 F.2d 598, 612 (3d Cir. 1986), 
and Green v. Scully, 850 F.2d 894, 904 (2d Cir. 1988).  On the methods “aptly described as 
physically intimidating, teetering on the brink of violence” used by police, including swearing, 
interrogating late at night, lying about evidence against a suspect and about their ability and 
willingness to get a suspect a lower sentence, see Akhil Reed Amar & Renée B. Lettow, Fifth 
Amendment First Principles: the Self-Incrimination Clause, 93 MICH. L. REV. 857, 873 (1995), 
citing DAVID SIMON, HOMICIDE: A YEAR ON THE KILLING STREETS 199-220 (1991) [hereinafter 
Amar & Lettow]. 
 226. See Stephen C. Thaman, Is America a Systematic Violator of Human Rights in the 
Administration of Criminal Justice? 44 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 999, 1010 (2000) [hereinafter Thaman, 
America]. 
 227. Andreas Ulrich, Wer tötete Johanna Schenuit?, 25 DER SPEIGEL 72 (2000). 
 228. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH: CONFESSIONS AT ANY COST: POLICE TORTURE IN RUSSIA 
21 (2000).  The favorite tools of the Russian police: beatings and asphyxiation, were also used by 
police in one Chicago precinct to coerce nine confessions in murder cases, some by innocent 
people, which led to death sentences.  See Steve Mills & Ken Armstrong, The Failure of the 
Death Penalty in Illinois: A Tortured Path to Death Row, CHI. TRIB. Nov. 17, 1999, at 1. 
 229. See text accompanying supra notes 75-80.  This could be done by organizing a pre-trial 
deposition before a judge, as is allowed in some states for the taking of witness testimony.  See 
MO. REV. STAT. §§ 25.12, 25.14 (1980). 
 230. See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text. 
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number of American commentators have suggested instituting questioning of 
criminal suspects by a magistrate and allowing comment on their silence in 
case they refuse.231  This would presumably mean adopting modified 
admonitions along the lines of England’s CJPOA.232  Some would restrict such 
compulsion to speak in cases where the suspect is caught in flagrante or when 
there is an adequate and/or convincing prima facie case of guilt.233  Some 
voices have gone even further, advocating a return to a purely inquisitorial 
system of compelled examination of criminal suspects by magistrates where 
the suspect’s silence would not only be used against him at trial, but would 
also be punished by contempt.234  Thus, ironically, the old common law 
jurisdictions are moving in a more inquisitorial direction and praising the 
principle of material truth235 at a time when the post-inquisitorial systems on 
 
 231. This would, of course, require overruling Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965).  See 
discussion in text accompanying supra note 193.  The classic positions are the following: Paul G. 
Kauper, Judicial Examination of the Accused—A Remedy for the Third Degree, 30 MICH. L. REV. 
1224 (1932); WALTER V. SCHAEFER, THE SUSPECT AND SOCIETY: CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AND 
CONVERGING CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINE 78 (1967); Henry J. Friendly, The Fifth Amendment 
Tomorrow: The Case for Constitutional Change, 37 U. CIN. L. REV. 671, 713, n.180, discussed in 
Yale Kamisar, On the “Fruits” of Miranda Violations, Coerced Confessions, and Compelled 
Testimony, 98 MICH. L. REV. 929, 931-32 (1995).  See also MARVIN E. FRANKEL, PARTISAN 
JUSTICE 98-99 (1980).  Professor Dripps has also advocated moving in this direction.  See Donald 
A. Dripps, Foreword: Against Police Interrogation—And the Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination, 78 J. CRIM. & CRIMINOLOGY 699, 730-31 (1988). 
 232. See discussion in text accompanying supra notes 97-101. 
 233. Cf. Alschuler, supra note 7, at 182, 203.  The same kind of probable cause was needed in 
Sixteenth Century Germany before one could use torture.  See supra note 5 and accompanying 
text.  This would amount to a kind of reversal of the burden of proof before trial in such a case 
and even, one could argue, in the elimination of the presumption of innocence.  But see Salabiaku 
v. France, 13 E.H.R.R. 379 (1991), and Pham Hoang v. France, 16 E.H.R.R. 53 (1993), 
demonstrating that a reversal of the burden of proof has been accepted by the European Court of 
Human Rights to some extent. 
 234. Amar & Lettow, supra note 225, at 898-99.  The authors would also subject a lying 
suspect to prosecution for perjury and even suggest augmentation of the sanctions for perjury.  Id. 
at 899 n.191.  The catch is that the statement would not be admissible at the suspect’s trial, but 
any other evidence found as a result of the coerced confession would be admissible.  Id. at 858.  
Police interrogation would be discouraged, but Amar and Lettow would still let in “fruits” of their 
illegal interrogations for they would have been “inevitably discovered” at the “civilized” 
interrogation by the magistrates.  Id. at 908 n.227.  Lawyers would be excluded from the judicial 
interrogations.  Id. at 899 n.192.  For criticism of Amar and Lettow’s reform proposals and their 
theoretical foundations, see Kamisar, supra note 231.  In my opinion, a proposal such as that of 
Amar and Lettow would be considered to violate human rights in all Western European countries.  
In addition, such a proposal would likely violate Article 6 of the European Convention of Human 
Rights.  See discussions of Murray v. United Kingdom and Condon v. United Kingdom, in text 
accompanying supra notes 205-212. 
 235. Examples of articles pushing the principle of material truth include: Marvin E. Frankel, 
The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1031 (1975); Thomas L. Steffen, 
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the European Continent are calling into question its centrality among their 
guiding principles.236 
While abolishing police interrogation would certainly put more pressure on 
police departments to do more exhaustive and costly criminal investigations, it 
would not necessarily result in fewer convictions.  There appear to be few 
cases among Miranda’s progeny decided by the U.S. Supreme Court in which 
the prime reason for police interrogation was to determine who committed the 
homicide.  More often than not it appears to have been to gather aggravating 
evidence which could even trigger a death penalty.237  Confessions in many 
cases are not primarily used to ascertain the truth but rather to facilitate the 
imposition of more severe punishments.  America is widely condemned around 
the world not only for its use of the death penalty, but also for its liberal use of 
extremely lengthy sentences, including life imprisonment, for non-violent 
crimes.238  The threat of these Draconian punishments also serves to enforce 
our system of plea-bargaining by inducing defendants to enter a plea of guilty 
to minimize their exposure to such punishments.239 
Can we reasonably allow suspects and accused individuals to aid in their 
own convictions by compelling them to a greater degree to submit to 
interrogations, by allowing comment and use of their silence, in a system 
 
Truth as Second Fiddle: Reevaluating the Place of Truth in the Adversarial Trial Ensemble, 1988 
UTAH L. REV. 799. 
 236. While trial judges in France (pursuant to C. PR. PEN-FRANCE § 310) and trial judges in 
Germany (pursuant to StPO-GERMANY § 244(2)) are obligated to ascertain the truth at trial, the 
role of Spain’s judges (pursuant to L.E.CRIM-SPAIN § 683) and Russia’s juries (pursuant to UPK 
RF-RUSSIA § 429 para. 1) is to facilitate an adversarial taking of the evidence conducive to 
finding the truth.  The Italian legislature’s attempt to transform the trial judge into a passive 
arbiter with no obligation to uncover the truth has been undermined by rulings of the Italian 
Supreme Court.  Supreme Court cases have clearly emphasized that the trial judge still has a duty 
to uncover the truth.  CASS. PENALE, 10 oct. 1991, n.648, 1258.  For a discussion, see Hans-
Heinrich Jescheck, Grundgedanken der neuen italienischen Strafprozeßordnung in 
rechtsvergleichender Sicht, in FESTSCHRIFT FÜR ARTHUR KAUFMANN ZUM 70 GEBURTSTAG, 
659, 663 (1993).  On the “overburdening” of the principle of material truth, see Bernd 
Schünemann, Reflexionen über die Zukunft des deutschen Strafverfahrens, in STRAFRECHT, 
UNTERNEHMENSRECHT, ANWALTSRECHT, FESTSCHRIFT FÜR GERD PFEIFFER, 461, 475 (1988).  
On the move in Europe away from the principle of material truth and its lack of continued 
vitality, see Thomas Weigend, Die Reform des Strafverfahrens, Europäische und deutsche 
Tendenzen und Probleme in 104 ZSTW 486, 488-96 (1992) [hereinafter Weigend, Reform]. 
 237. Indeed, in Miranda itself, eyewitnesses had already identified Miranda and the defendant 
in a consolidated case, Vignera v. New York.  In addition, the defendant in California v. Stewart 
had been identified cashing checks of the robbery-murder victim and evidence from that crime 
and other similar crimes had been found in his apartment following a search.  Stewart had been 
sentenced to death.  384 U.S. at 456-57. 
 238. See Thaman, America, supra note 226, at 1000-01, 1021-23.  Even in times of 
prosperity, such as the present, when crime rates are decreasing, America incarcerates more of its 
children per capita perhaps than any other country in the history of the world.  Id. at 1015. 
 239. Id. at 1015-16. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2001] MIRANDA IN COMPARATIVE LAW 623 
which subjects them to punishments viewed as cruel and inhumane by 
many?240  Police are also given a free hand at interrogation of juveniles and the 
mentally retarded.  These disabled individuals are particularly good candidates 
for either not comprehending their constitutional rights or for being induced to 
confess to crimes they did not commit.  As a result, they become subject to the 
death penalty if convicted of capital murder based on such confessions.241 
It is no coincidence that the principle of material truth, or the duty of the 
organs of law enforcement to ascertain the truth, developed in a system which 
used torture to compel confessions and which was characterized by its brutal 
treatment not only of common criminals, but also of dissidents.  Its goal was 
punishment, not truth.  Perhaps the best vehicle for ascertaining the truth is to 
induce it with lenience, compassion or forgiveness.  The approach taken by the 
Republic of South Africa in granting amnesty to those guilty of horrendous 
crimes during the reign of apartheid to those who honestly reveal their 
complicity therein is an example which should be studied by American truth-
seekers.  One could also study the Netherlands, which has an inquisitorial 
system with no lay participation and a largely written trial, in which the great 
bulk of all accused individuals confess.  This occurs in the context of a liberal 
society administered by more or less liberal, compassionate prosecutors and 
judges.242 
As long as the United States continues executing those who confess to 
aggravated murders (most of whom are guilty) and imposing Draconian 
sentences of deprivation of liberty in other felony cases, the American regime 
of allowing police interrogations without any warnings in non-custody 
situations and of custodial interrogations without counsel following waivers is 
too susceptible to manipulation by police and prosecutors and should be 
changed along the lines of the regime contemplated in the Italian Code of 
 
 240. The growing consensus around the world is that the death penalty itself violates human 
rights.  See ECHR, supra note 57, at Protocol 7.  See also Second Optional Protocol to ICCPR. 
(G.A. Res. No. 44/128, 15 December 1989), cited in BASSIOUNI, supra note 57, at 20. 
 241. The U.S. Supreme Court’s sanctioning of the execution of minors under eighteen years 
of age and the mentally disabled have deservedly attracted severe condemnation from overseas.  
See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 838 (1988); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 340 
(1989). See also Thaman, America, supra note 226, at 1023. 
 242. Most Dutch defendants confess. An unpublished study of this phenomenon by the Max-
Planck-Institute for Foreign and International Comparative Law in 1978 found that the reason for 
the Dutch defendant’s readiness to confess is to some extent attributable to the fact that Dutch 
judges do not always impose the maximum sentence and “handle cases with socially integrative 
notions and without emotions.”  The sentences are exceptionally more lenient in type of sanction, 
and magnitude thereof, than in Germany.  Not so much is at stake.  He can accept what awaits 
him. He thus accepts punishment.  See Ingrid Van de Reyt, Niederlande, in DIE 
BEWEISAUFNAHME IM STRAFVERFAHRENSRECHT DES AUSLANDS 284, 314 (Walter Perron, ed., 
1995). 
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Criminal Procedure.243  Once we join the rest of the civilized world and begin 
treating our criminals as our children; once we recognize that they have 
become criminals only after being raised in our families, our neighborhoods 
and having gone to our schools and churches, only then can we begin treating 
them compassionately and trying to address the root of the problem with 
something other than repression.  When those who violate the law realize they 
will be treated fairly and compassionately and receive a humane punishment 
for their crimes which will allow a possibility of rehabilitation and 
reintegration into the community, maybe then they will be more likely to speak 
the truth.244 
 
 
 243. See supra text accompanying note 76. 
 244. And in this respect, a system of compassionate sentence bargaining, which would reward 
an honest acceptance of truth with a humane sentence, could be considered not as an end run 
around due process, but, with due participation of the victim in cases where there is one (most of 
our sentenced prisoners have committed victimless crimes), as a restoration of the judicial peace 
and a step towards reconciliation of offender with the victim and society.  On this approach, see 
Weigend, Reform, supra note 236, at 493-501.  See also Roxin, supra note 84, at 195-96. 
